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FOREWORD
Due to ageing populations and concerns over economic growth and employment, 
many countries are planning and implementing reforms that aim to make pensions 
systems more sustainable. One key issue in the reform debates has been the extent 
of public responsibility, and many existing pension puzzles have been solved by 
increasing private responsibility, for instance by supporting private pension savings.
However, the boundaries between public and private responsibility are hardly clear-
cut. Many public schemes involve private elements. On the other hand, private 
solutions are often backed by public arrangements, for instance in the form of fiscal 
policy. Instead of black and white, public or private pension arrangements, we thus 
have a multitude of pension systems that contain public and private responsibility, 
in different shades of grey. Consequently, instead of a privatization of pension 
schemes, one could talk of increasing public/private mixes. What is interesting is 
that combining public and private features in a pension system generates a need to 
create new types of operational frameworks for running the system. There is very 
little research on this issue in pension studies internationally.
The Finnish earnings-related pension scheme provides a very good basis for 
a case study, as it has a half-century long history as a public-private partnership. 
The Finnish TyEL scheme is categorized as a first-pillar scheme and often depicted 
as part of public responsibility, because it is a mandatory defined benefit scheme 
that covers close to 100% of the private-sector employees’ old-age, disability and 
surviving spouse’s pensions, on equal terms. Interestingly, it is partially funded 
and financed by employer and employee contributions that are collected by private 
pension funds or companies that also manage the funds. In other words, the scheme 
is executed by private pension providers and there is no role for tax financing. 
Although established already in the 1960s, it apparently contains many of the 
elements emerging in re-formed pension systems of today.
This research examines the governance of the Finnish TyEL pension scheme 
from an institutionalist perspective, and focuses on the interplay between public 
and private modes of governance and interests. The research investigates the roles 
and relationships of different actors by analysing governance and coordination 
mechanisms in the scheme, as well as matters related to the implementation of 
the scheme. One of the findings is that public-private partnership structures and 
processes are evident everywhere and that the running of the scheme is inherently 
based on different patterns of negotiation and clearing. This is why I believe the 
report could be interesting, not only in Finland, but also in a great number of other 
countries that are increasingly facing the question of how to combine public and 
private elements in pension systems. The research has been funded by the Academy 
of Finland and a few Finnish foundations. The Finnish Centre for Pensions has 
not taken part in the research process and its role is limited to making the research 
available to a wider audience.
Mikko Kautto
Head of Research Department
The Finnish Centre for Pensions, Finland
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ABBREVIATIONS
Most abbreviations on the institutions used in this study are based on common 
abbreviations in Finnish.
CA Kilpailuvirasto, the Competition Authority
ETK Eläketurvakeskus, the Finnish Centre for Pensions
FIN-FSA Finanssivalvonta, the Financial Supervisory Authority
LEL The earnings-related pension scheme for short-term private sector 
 workers (1961–2006)
KELA Kansaneläkelaitos, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland
PAYG Pay-as-you-go
PIC Pension Insurance Company (työeläkevakuutusyhtiö)
STM Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
TaEL The earnings-related pension scheme for artists (1986–2006)
TEL The earnings-related pension scheme for private sector workers (1962– 
 2006)
TELA Työeläkevakuuttajat, the Finnish Pension Alliance
TyEL The earnings-related pension scheme for private sector workers 
 (replacing TEL, LEL and TaEL, 2007–)
TUPO Tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu, the Finnish tripartite economic policy-
 setting arena between central labour market organisations and the state
VM Valtiovarainministeriö, the Ministry of Finance
YEL The earnings-related pension scheme for the self-employed
ABSTRACT
One of the key trends in European pension reforms has been the introduction of private 
elements to first-pillar public pension schemes. However, the administrative logics 
of these public private partnerships (PPPs) have not been yet studied systematically. 
This study develops a theoretical framework for studying the governance institutions 
of PPP type organisation fields in context of pension provision, and applies this 
framework to a case study on the Finnish TyEL scheme. The Finnish case illustrates 
a mature field combining different modes of governance and revealing tensions that 
can be managed if not necessarily solved in PPP type pension provision.
Keywords: corporate governance, Finnish pension system, organisation fields, 
pension policy, pension provision, public administration
ABSTRAKTI
Lukuisiin eurooppalaisiin ensimmäisen pilarin julkisiin eläkejärjestelmiin on viime 
vuosina yhdistetty yksityisiä elementtejä. Näiden julkisyksityisten kumppanuuksien 
hallinnollista logiikkaa ei ole kuitenkaan vielä tutkittu järjestelmällisesti. Tämän 
tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on kehittää teoreettinen viitekehys julkisyksityisten 
eläkejärjestelmien hallinnollisten instituutioiden tutkimukseen. Suomen laki sääteinen 
työeläkejärjestelmä toimii tämän lähestymistavan empiirisenä tutkimus kohteena. 
Tapaus TyEL tarjoaa kypsänä organisaatiokenttänä lukuisia esimerkkejä siitä, miten 
erilaisia hallintomalleja voidaan yhdistää sekä yhdistämisen tuottavia jännitteitä 
hallita.
Asiasanat: eläkejärjestelmät, eläkepolitiikka, julkishallinto, organisaatiokentät, 
työ eläke järjestelmä, yhtiön hallinto

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The redrawing of public and private responsibilities and management has been 
one of the key issues in debates over pension provision in the beginning of 
the 21st century. In recent years, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become 
very common in traditionally publicly executed first pillar European pension 
systems, as first pillar schemes are now executed by private entities in over a dozen 
countries. Yet there is very little academic knowledge on how the different logics 
of public administration, corporate governance and other forms of governance 
penetrate these arrangements and what kinds of power systems and dynamics 
different combinations of these logics create.
The purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical-methodological framework 
for studying the logics of governance in PPP type pension provision, and to 
apply it in an empirical case study. It is argued that governance logics in pension 
provision can be here best approached by studying the institutional relationships 
between key actors in organisation fields of pension provision related to a specified 
pension policy. The developed framework is based on agency and action process 
centred version of new institutional theory that highlights constant maintenance 
and renewal of different institutional forms central in defining the institutional life 
of governance. The framework combines the general ideal type institutional field-
level logics of governance in public administration and corporate governance with 
more particular hypotheses arising from different strands of academic literature on 
pension governance and European pension provision. 
The theoretical framework is applied in a theory-driven case analysis based on 
multiple sources of data. The unit of analysis is here the organisation field of the 
Finnish TyEL scheme: a mandatory, earnings-related, partially funded, defined 
benefit, employer and employee co-sponsored pension scheme covering old-age, 
disability and widow’s pensions for almost all Finnish private sector workers, which 
is executed by private pension providers. The scheme has been a PPP since its birth 
in 1962, which is why studying this mature organisation field provides valuable 
information on how different logics of governance have been and can be asserted 
together in the future in which these kinds of partially funded public-private mixes 
are more likely to be increased than decreased in number in Europe.
In order to highlight the relationship between an organisation field and a pension 
policy, the narrative of the research report is divided according to the conventional 
institutional policy process model. The original formation process of the TyEL field 
continues to explain a number of today’s governance issues, most importantly those 
related to the decentralisation of implementation in the nationally mandatory scheme. 
Among other things, formation includes significant institutional boundaries like the 
EU rules and elimination of state authority, and divides the logics of governance 
to decentralised private power over assets generated by and to labour market party 
driven, politically selective centralised power over the benefits and contributions 
related to the scheme. The coordination structure of the field is based on centralised 
omnipresence of key actors in networked ad hoc groups. The implementation is 
based on private actors, with a variety of organisational forms, that compete and 
cooperate in limited and in various ways problematic terms, whilst the control of 
pension provision is in great parts in hands of public bodies in the field.
The empirical case study results suggest that the typical issues and relationships 
between key actors that in fact predominate PPP type pension governance cannot 
be captured with the currently dominant theoretical frameworks and ideal type 
models. Moreover, the empirical case study shows that the combination of a number 
of ideal type factors can happen in ways that blur the distinction between public 
and private modes of governance and their conceptual validity. This suggests 
that empirical studies on PPP type pension governance rooted in institutional 
organisation field analysis can result in more accurate and analytically rigorous 
descriptions of governance than the mainstream theoretical frameworks classifying 
pension schemes that in contrast tend to ignore such descriptions. 
However, the case study also reveals that the combination of features belonging 
to different ideal type modes of governance may cause elastic tensions in pension 
governance, which confirms the importance of studying the public and private 
characteristics in pension governance, and the need for further studies on tensions 
in PPP type pension governance. Whilst some of these tensions might improve the 
innovation capabilities of the field, some of them remain problematic in practice 
especially for the field insiders. This suggests that the need for further research is 
not only academic but practical as well. In order to highlight the practical relevance 
of the study, the book ends with some insights and future points of references for 
debates on Finnish governance that emerged during the research process.
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1 Introduction
The redrawing of public and private responsibilities and control has been one of the 
key issues in academic debates over pension provision in the 21st century besides 
financial and social sustainability (see Clark & Whiteside 2005). The new analytical 
tools redefining the public-private-division and reclassifying pension schemes may 
increase our understanding on how different pension regimes are formed from 
a legal point of view, and more generally where public and private meet in the 
domain of pension provision. Yet, they tell us little or nothing about how exactly 
different kinds of schemes including division of labour between public and private 
domains actually work in terms of governance and administration. We have very 
little academic knowledge on how the different logics of public administration, 
corporate governance and other forms of governance penetrate these arrangements 
and what kinds of power systems and dynamics different combinations of these 
logics create. Put simply, the pension schemes including both public and private 
features are rarely analysed properly as public-private partnerships (PPP).
The purpose of this study is to provide knowledge on how different forms and 
logics of governance penetrate a nationally mandatory pension scheme that is 
executed by private entities. In recent years, PPPs have become more common 
in previously publicly executed first pillar systems. Currently traditional first 
pillar schemes are executed by private entities in Europe in Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom (Briganti 2008). These arrangements 
can be divided to at least three categories. They can be regarded as new kinds of 
schemes separate from both first and second pillar systems, second tiers of the first 
pillar systems or the legislated first tiers of the second pillar systems. Although this 
division might be essential from the European regulatory perspective for example, 
we argue it is less important in terms of governance: what matters is that there are at 
least two traditionally very different logics of government, public administration and 
corporate governance in play. Despite the differences in European public pension 
reform trajectories (see e.g. Vidlund 2006; Immergut, Anderson et al. 2007), the 
most common features in major reforms have been advancing of funding, private 
management, and individual defined contribution accounts (Thompson 2001) – all 
features potentially affecting the logic of governance in a significant scope.
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As pension provision has not been analysed in terms of PPPs, an empirical 
study on it is necessarily theory-driven and exploratory. We argue that the logic 
of governance in these PPPs can be theoretically and methodologically best 
approached by studying the organisation fields of pension provision related to a 
specified pension policy. This approach rooted in middle-range theory has a few 
advantages. Firstly, the PPPs related to pension provision include many different 
kinds of relevant actors, practices, rules and schema that differ from one country to 
another. Whilst the dominant Anglo-American literature on governance of pension 
provision relies on rather micro-level analysis based on a plurality of schemes, 
on specific rules (i.e. so-called fiduciary duty) bringing specific decisions to the 
level of individual organisations, on specific types of actors (trust-based pension 
funds), and on their specific political-economic context, the European pension 
heterogeneity can be hardly inspected by simply introducing new parameters 
to these theoretical frameworks (compare Clark 2003 and 2000). Similarly, by 
approaching the issue by studying how different organisations operate and interact 
in the field pension provision, we can grasp a methodologically nuanced account 
on the everyday life of pension governance in PPPs without assuming too much 
on the micro-level consequences or mediation structures of macro-level European 
institutional frameworks, which has been the dominant scale in which European 
pension policy has been discussed (see e.g. Immergut, Anderson et al. 2007). We 
believe the middle-range field analysis provides an important approach that can 
cover some of the gaps between European and Anglo-American pension governance 
literature, and enables further comparative studies in pension governance especially 
in context of European pension systems.
Secondly, the approach avoids some established academic discursive theoretical 
frameworks such as pillars and tiers and more general theoretical accounts like 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes or the division to Beveridgian and Bismarckian 
pension regimes. This is important as even those pension policies that may illustrate 
similar social policy paradigms may at the same time illustrate great organisational 
differences – witness the mandates of organisations executing pension provision 
within Nordic pension regimes and within different corporatist European countries. 
Moreover, even the most detailed of these theoretical classifications, based for 
example on “institutional checklists” (Soede & Vrooman 2008), cannot produce 
empirically accurate actor-based descriptions on governance processes. The 
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institutional interplays in pension regimes are fundamental, almost trivial, yet 
ignored issue in understanding how pension provision exactly works in terms 
of governance. The framework developed in this study is based on agency and 
action process centred version of new institutional theory that highlights constant 
maintenance and renewal of a variety of institutional forms central in defining 
the institutional life of governance. Whilst the framework developed in this study 
provides some hypotheses based on combining the general ideal type institutional 
field-level logics of governance in public administration and corporate governance 
with particular hypotheses arising from different strands of academic literature on 
pension governance and European pension provision, it is argued that it is the elastic 
real-life contexts and practices that provide the more fertile ground for comparative 
studies on pension governance than any macro-level theoretical conceptualisation.
The relevance of this theoretical framework is tested in this study in an empirical 
enquiry. The study follows a case study approach (Yin 2009), in which the unit of 
analysis is an organisational field comprising of organisations as collective actors. 
Our theoretical attachment to institutional theory in general and institutional field 
analysis in particular orients our endeavour to see pension governance as a constant 
struggle in establishing, maintaining and losing positions in the field. A theory-driven 
description is well suited for examining an area of analysis that has not previously 
been conceptualised in field level terms. Case studies where the unit of observation 
is narrower than the unit of analysis enable to achieve analytic rigour that often 
evades descriptive approaches. In this study, the different stages in policy process, 
turning points in the maturing of the pension system, as well as differentiated roles 
and tensions attached to different organisations serve as the units of observation, 
which gives structure for the reporting of the findings and shifts focus towards the 
major changes and developments within the field.
Our case study is focused on the Finnish earnings-related pension system TyEL. 
From the perspective of benefits and contributions, Finnish TyEL pensions scheme is 
a mandatory, earnings-related, partially funded, defined benefit (DB), employer and 
employee co-sponsored pension scheme covering old-age, disability and widow’s 
pensions for almost all Finnish private sector workers. The monthly paid benefits 
are by law accrued from annual incomes, and complemented progressively by 
the national pension scheme until a specified level of TyEL benefits. The scheme 
is, however, executed by different types of private pension providers: pension 
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insurance companies (PICs), company pension funds or industry-wide funds. The 
field in question is large, complex and not without historical peculiarities, and in 
this respect deserves attention by its own right. The TyEL pension scheme is also 
considered financially and socially among the most sustainable DB schemes in the 
world, and it has been a key factor in Finnish economic development due to its 
ability to provide productive capital for the economy (Kangas 2006; Jäntti, Saari et 
al. 2006). Yet perhaps the most important feature of the scheme is that it has been 
a PPP since its birth in 1962, after which plenty of European first pillar schemes 
have followed in adopting private elements. Understanding the governance logic 
of the Finnish scheme provides valuable information on how different logics of 
governance have been and can be in the future asserted together, in which these 
kinds of partially funded public-private mixes are more likely to be increased in 
number in Europe rather than decreased.
The data used in the empirical study consists of interviews, participant 
observation, archival data and previous investigation on the development of the 
Finnish pension system. The interviews refer to in total seventeen close dialogue 
interviews, which as a method is developed exactly for conditions of scarce 
information availability due to institutional constraints like business secrecy (see 
Clark 1998), conducted by one of the authors (Sorsa). The interviewees primarily 
consisted of pension insurance company (PIC) investment personnel, ranging from 
portfolio managers to Chief Investment Officers, and included five interviews on 
directors (ranging from division directors to CEOs) of policy coordination bodies or 
pension providers. The status or affiliate organisations of individual interviewees are 
not presented in this study due to confidential nature of the interviews. Whenever a 
status or name of an organisation or a person is mentioned in this study, it is based 
on other data than the interviews.
Participant observation refers to the mandatory education for the new board 
members of PICs given by The Finnish Pension Alliance TELA, and to an annual 
TyEL investment seminar (held at PIC Varma). Both the authors attended both 
these events in the first half of 2009. The authors also participated in a special 
education arranged by TELA to the Pension Power in Finland research team 
led by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy ETLA in late 2008. This 
education was primarily governance-focused. The participant data includes notes 
on four half-day oral presentations and discussions on them, and hundreds of pages 
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of PowerPoint slides, other documents, and books provided in the education. The 
primary type of archival data refers to membership data on committees and ad 
hoc groups more or less formally responsible for cooperation and development 
of the pension system. Annual report of the cooperation and development groups 
(Kortesoja & Huikuri 2009) provided the frame for identifying the relevant groups, 
whilst the actual membership data was extracted from Hare-register maintained by 
the Prime Minister’s Office, Centre for Pensions, and TELA, and from individual 
group members.  Another type of archival data consists of various forms of publicly 
available material, including laws, regulations, media stories, reports generated in 
the field (by Government bodies, ETK, TELA etc.), and annual reports (of 2008 if 
not stated otherwise), financial statements and appendices, Articles of Association, 
websites, and policy documents (social responsibility, ownership policies etc.) of 
PICs. These sources are cited and listed if presented as empirical examples in the 
text. All previous investigations used in this study are cited and referenced in the text.
The sequence of the elaboration follows the theory-driven case study approach. 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, is dedicated to the presentation of institutional 
theory and the basic concepts used in the development of our theoretical model: 
governance, organisation fields, institutional work and institutional entrepreneurship. 
In Chapter 3, we explore previous academic studies and discuss the relevant logics 
of governance in context of PPP type pension provision. The chapter introduces 
the characteristics of public administration and corporate governance in field-
level governance, and outlines some basic characteristics of pension governance 
in European countries. The Finnish case study is discussed in two consecutive 
chapters. In Chapter 4, we present briefly some basic characteristics and actors of 
the Finnish earnings-related pension regime, which need to be acknowledged in 
order to provide basic terminological and technical understanding needed in the 
analysis presented in the following chapter. 
The extensive Chapter 5 is dedicated to analysing and presenting the organisation 
field of the TyEL pension scheme. As noted above, pension governance is an issue 
that calls for much attention as such. However, we also argue that organisation 
fields of pension provision serve as important frameworks for pension politics. 
As the theories on organisation fields suggest, it serves as a template of mutual 
relationships between key actors planning, defining and redefining pension policies. 
In this respect, the focus on organisation fields provides valuable information for 
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those scholars interested in the processes and institutional frameworks in which 
pensions related issues are politicised and negotiated. In order to highlight this 
aspect, we have divided the narrative of our analysis according to the conventional 
policy process model, whose usage and its limitations are discussed in more detail 
in the following chapters. Whereas the analysis in Chapter 5 uses the field-level 
institutional terminology, Chapter 6 is dedicated to summarising and discussing 
the results of the empirical case analysis in the context of PPPs. The purpose of 
the chapter is to draw conclusions on how the field-level study helps to understand 
the combination of public and private logics of governance in pension provision. 
Although the purpose of the whole book is to provide insights on pension governance 
in European level, we end the book to discussion on the more practical relevance 
of the study to the functioning of the TyEL field on presenting some points of focus 
for further debates on Finnish pension governance.
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2 Institutions, Organisation Fields  
 and Governance
The theoretical background of this study is in new institutional theory. The point of 
departure for institutionalist thinking is that all actions, individual and collective, are 
embedded in institutional forms: social structures that have reached a high degree 
of elasticity and resilience, and that constitute, enable and constrain actors’ courses 
of action (Scott 2008). In institutionalist thinking, actors follow these structures that 
are however created and enforced only by these very same actions. Actors ‘make 
use’ of institutional forms differently, they can always choose to act otherwise, and 
to follow one institution instead of another (see e.g. Crouch, Streeck et al. 2007). 
Institutions are heuristically located in institutional environments – community-
wide informal conventions, customs, norms, and social routines, and the formal 
structures of rules and regulations which constrain and control behaviour – and in 
institutional arrangements – the particular, governed organisational forms such as 
markets, firms, labour unions, or regulatory agencies that arise from institutional 
environments (Martin 2002). In neither location are institutional structures and 
dynamics determined functionally but they are relatively autonomous (i.e. they have 
their own ‘laws of motion’). The patterns of economic behaviour are not exclusively 
determined by institutional rules nor can they be predictably manipulated through 
institutional change (Peck 2000). 
Commitment to institutionalism implies an interest not merely in institutional 
forms like rules and laws but in knowing on how the forms are used and otherwise 
affect different actions in practice. Institutionalism is not a single theory but a variety 
of approaches in social theory that aims at explaining a variety of issues, e.g. why 
actors behave the way they do, how social structures interact, what organisations 
are, and why some social practices persist over time, to mention a few. There are at 
least three more or less separate institutionalist traditions: historical institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism, and organisation theory (see e.g. Campbell 2004; 
Crouch & Streeck 1997; Scott 2008; Hall & Thelen 2009; Lounsbury 2008; 
Streeck & Thelen 2005). Our approach to institutional thought is not exclusively 
limited to any of these views but rather inspired by all of them. Our approach could 
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be called organisational analysis that follows the sociological variant of agency 
theory (see Gronow 2008).
For Scott (2008), institutions ‘are comprised of regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life’. We follow Heiskala (2007) and 
Gronow (2008), for whom these elements don’t appear as pillars but simply as 
different types of institutions according to the logic of language and enforcement 
of different institutional forms. The three types of institutions can be heuristically 
summarised as follows. The regulative view concentrates on legally sanctioned 
and other typically formal rules, which mandate and coerce individuals to behave 
in line with institutional ends via instrumentally rational compliance. Essentially, 
this regulative view embraces institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990). 
Normative theorists, classic sociologists in essence, include moral issues in the 
picture. These norms – expectations, values, duties and other normative things 
explicated to the actor or internalised in socialisation processes – weigh on actors 
as moral obligations Cultural-cognitive or discursive1 theorists, often inspired by 
phenomenology, propose that moral obligations are just one set of cultural schema, 
and emphasize the nature of institutions as knowledge schemas that are common 
beliefs about the nature of social roles and situations. The mechanism behind these 
institutions is mimesis, i.e. actors act in certain ways because these ways promote 
some understanding of the world and make actions comprehensible. Although 
broader versions of institutional theory exist (see Gronow 2008), we focus here on 
these three types of institutions for the purposes of research economy.
The institutional approach to governance looks not only at how different 
institutions are put in play but also where they reside. In Scott’s (2008) work, 
institutions are considered being embedded in different kinds of carriers of 
institutional arrangements. Carriers refer to repositories of institutions like 
symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and all kinds of artefacts that 
embody institutions to different kinds of human beings, actors, resources and other 
1 Gronow (2008) has re-titled cultural-cognitive institutions as discursive institutions 
because cultural-cognitive institutions are not only based on knowledge or ‘culture’ 
in sense of a given system of meanings and their relations, but they are in nature 
discursively reproduced reciprocal typifications and actively typified knowledge 
rather than just any simply given typification or any piece of knowledge.
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material objects. As it is the case with different types of institutions, taking different 
carriers central instead of others gives a different focus for research questions. 
Although other carriers have relevance in the academic fields of governance and 
administration studies, our study is limited to relational systems that specifically 
address the questions of power in terms of roles of and relationships between 
different actors. Relational systems primarily denote social positions and networks. 
In institutional terms, they refer to formal governance structures and power systems 
(in regulative terms), regimes and authority systems (normative), and identities and 
structural isomorphisms (discursive) – the usage of power via social roles, mandates, 
authoritative hierarchies, schema and duties, and identities of different actors in 
an institutional arrangement that enables, constrains and conditions collective and 
individual actors’ behaviour.
Organisation Fields and Governance
The research question of this study, what is governance in pension provision like, can 
be formulated as follows. Our goal is to discover the relevant regulative, normative, 
and discursive institutions that constitute the relational systems of a pension scheme. 
There are, however, various scales in which such systems can be approached from 
society-level institutions to meso-level organisation fields, individual organisations, 
or even organisational subsystems (Scott 2008). In this study, we regard these levels 
of analysis not as ontological commitments to some scales or organisational types 
but rather as pragmatic conceptual tools for comparing different units of analysis. 
We use the level of organisation fields in order to include a large number of actors 
and their mutual relationships into one consistent analysis. This is why the emphasis 
of our examination is on the organisational and inter-organisational level rather 
than on intra-organisational level.
Organisation fields are particular kinds of levels of analysis on institutional 
arrangements. A field constitutes a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations 
that produce similar services or products (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Moreover, 
organisation field refers to the existence of community of organisations partaking 
in a common meaning whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully 
with one another than with actors outside of the field (Scott 2008). In another 
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sense, fields are networks of actors within a relatively stable alignment of material, 
organisational and discursive forces (Levy & Scully 2007). The concept of 
organisation field challenges concepts such as environment that favour a passive 
construction of agents. It reminds that social contexts of specific economic actors 
are not just random collections of resources and schemas, nor are they constructs 
defined by disembodied dimensions, such as complexity and munificence; rather, 
they are themselves organized (Scott 2008).
Fields can be conceptualised in different ways. Martin (2003) sees a tendency to 
view fields in three different senses. In the first sense, a field is a purely topographical 
construct, an analytic area of simplified dimensions in which we position persons or 
institutions. In the second sense, field appears as a more or less fixed organisation 
of forces. In a third sense, the field is a ground for contestation or a battlefield. The 
first sense of the field has its roots in the psychology of perception and the second 
in an analogy to physics. The third conception suits our governance focus best. 
Here, analogy to a familiar notion of game might be useful. The game provides 
a set of rules to orient the actions of the participants and most of the action takes 
place endogenously within the field itself. In our sociological variant of institutional 
agency theory, rules do not refer only to formal regulative rules but to many kinds 
of written or unwritten, formal and informal regulative, normative and discursive 
structures and practices that can be in principle codified as rules (Hodgson 2006). 
Yet, the field does not determine events, the success of different players, or even 
most issues in which mutual relationships (antagonistic, cooperative or otherwise) 
become important. Results are not determined by the rules but the game, and the 
events of the game are contingent despite being significant conditioned by the rules.
Drawing from debates in institutional theory, we recognise governance is 
present in the organisation field level in at least two different ways. Firstly, there 
is governance as the practiced institutional life in relational systems discussed 
above. Secondly, there is the issue of how the limits of this institutional life and the 
life itself can be changed. Returning to the analogy of game, the question is how 
rules of the game are (re)set, old rules disbanded, and new rules created in order 
to develop or maintain the game. Boundaries limit the field to a recognized set of 
organisations engaged in similar function that shape field activity and definitions 
(Delbridge & Edwards 2007). Boundaries form an essential relationship to the rules. 
The permeability of boundaries increases the possible institutional referents, thus 
23FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
providing fertile ground for growing alternative institutional logics of action (see 
Lounsbury 2008) within a given institutional field. Alternative institutional logics 
may open up field boundaries and reconstitute its power relations and governance 
structures. In these terms of rules and boundaries, governance resides in frameworks 
more or less external to the actors of the field. The key issue here is that the field and 
its rules of game in specific already condition these ostensibly external mechanisms.
Institutional Work and Entrepreneurship
Changes to internal logics and external boundaries can be caused by insider actions 
as much as external boundary-drawing. In this study, we are not proposing a strict 
distinction of external and internal causes for and forces of change, but rather rely 
on concepts that make them both observable. The first notion we use is the notion 
of institutional work in order to increase understanding on how actors purposefully 
act, alone or in cooperation, with aims at creating, maintaining and disrupting the 
field-level structures or ‘negotiated orders’ that condition their life (see Lawrence, 
Suddaby et al. 2009). The concept of institutional work highlights three important 
issues (Lawrence & Suddaby 2006). Firstly, it highlights the awareness, skill, and 
reflexivity of individual and collective actors. Secondly, it increases understanding 
of institutions as constituted in the more or less conscious actions of individual and 
collective actors. Thirdly, it adopts a perspective that suggests we cannot step outside 
actions as practices. Even those actions that are aimed at changing the institutional 
order of an organisational field occur in relation to the sets of institutionalised rules. 
The main strength of the approach is that it brings politics back to institutional 
analyses that have tended to be more ‘apolitical’.
Institutional work offers a viable analytical framework for highly political fields 
like ones related to mandatory pension provision, whose birth, reformulations, 
adjustments and administration include many collective efforts. This approach strips 
away the taken-for-grantedness from institutional research and directly addresses 
‘the core problem of how man-made products and events come to perceived and 
represented as natural social orders’ (Lawrence & Suddaby 2006). The concept 
highlights different aspects in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. The 
first one includes overtly political work in which actors reconstruct rules, property 
rights and boundaries that define access to material resources (in terms of Lawrence 
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& Suddaby 2006: vesting, defining and advocacy), actions in which actors’ belief 
systems are reconfigured (constructing identities, changing norms and constructing 
networks), and actions designed to alter abstract categorisations in which the 
boundaries of meaning systems are altered (mimicry, theorising, and educating). 
Maintenance includes both maintenance of institutions through ensuring adherence 
to rule systems (enabling, policing and deterring) and the efforts to maintain 
institutions on reproducing existing norms and belief systems (valorising/demonising, 
mythologising, and embedding and routinising). Disruption also has many forms. 
Disruption includes attempts to disconnect rewards and sanctions from some set of 
practices, technologies or rules, to disassociate the practice, rule or technology from 
its moral foundation as appropriate within a specific cultural context, and to disrupt 
institutions by undermining their core assumptions and beliefs.
It must be noted that using the concept of institutional work does not imply 
that only purposeful collective efforts generate institutional change: it is only these 
efforts that are hypothetically most relevant. In field a level study, it is essential to 
understand all dynamic processes that change the rules of the game. For instance 
the mere existence of multiple logics of action may provide dynamic properties for 
governance as such. These logics are the belief systems that guide actions in field 
and provide a basis for legitimacy for the formation of new identities, practices 
and relationships within the given field (Green, Babb et al. 2008). Multiple logics 
highlight the field as a different kind of political arena in which entrepreneurs apply 
their social skills to maintain and transform some institutional practices simply by 
seeking legitimacy from various sources by different means. This issue is addressed 
by another essential concept being in strong contrast to the more political concept 
of institutional work: the much-discussed notion of institutional entrepreneurship.
Institutional entrepreneurs refer to the actors with most capabilities to affect 
their networks, whose actions most probably cause institutional change (e.g. 
Campbell 2004; Crouch 2005; in context of pensions, see e.g. Dixon & Sorsa 2009). 
They use mechanisms of institutional change like bricolage and translation in 
combining various institutional forms and non-local ideas and practices to transform 
current practices and create new ones. Institutional entrepreneurship represents the 
activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements 
and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing 
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ones (Maguire, Hardy et al. 2004), especially ‘from the within’. The concept has 
been extensively theorised in organisation studies. For example, Perkmann and 
Spicer (2007) identify three types of projects in which institutional entrepreneurs 
engage themselves. In interaction projects, entrepreneurs relate to others in gathering 
support and building coalitions. In technical projects entrepreneurs theorise by 
identifying abstract categories and formulating notions of causal chains of events 
and in cultural projects entrepreneurs aim to frame institutions in ways that appeal 
to wider audiences. 
Despite these broad recent debates, one of the traditional theoretical problems in 
institutional analyses has been the inability to incorporate change to examination. 
The legacy of institutional theory has emphasised continuity over change and 
external change over internal development, which is in contrast with the importance 
of endogenous actions and tensions within the field itself. What is common to 
both approaches of institutional work and entrepreneurship is that institutional 
constellations are always negotiated orders – ‘residues of conflict and structurations 
of power’, as Korpi (2001) puts it – that can and will be renegotiated time to time. 
The advocates of institutional work look directly at the negotiation practices, and 
the advocates of institutional entrepreneurship recognise that there are differences in 
capabilities of actors to produce change in different positions. Moreover, the motives 
for entrepreneurship can be found, for instance, in the tendency of institutions to 
divide negotiated benefits unevenly which encourages actors to improve their 
position (Streeck & Thelen 2005).
In brief, both these concepts have a strong commitment to relational systems 
and history in organisation field level studies, and they are both useful in bringing 
institutional change in the analysis of field governance: institutional work with focus 
on political bargaining and institutional entrepreneurship on gradual micro-level 
change. It must be noted, however, that institutional work and entrepreneurship 
not only function in nascent fields, but proceeds in well-established mature ones 
as well (Greenwood, Suddaby et al. 2002). Indeed, the advancement in the age 
of organisations typically increases formalisation, written rules and regulations. 
This is why any major power shift replacing ‘the dominant coalition’ (see Cyert & 
March 1963) proceeds through a change in the structure of the formative rules. In 
emerging fields the diffuse and ambiguous power structure makes it difficult for 
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individual actors to rely on the regulative power of the rules. In such setting, actors 
can use variety of more informal power tactics such as persuasion, agenda-setting 
and non-decision making (Maguire, Hardy et al. 2004).
There have been various debates concerning institutional change in the field 
level. For example, Greenwood et al. (2002) have proposed an institutional change 
process model. The essence of the process is that there is always a catalyst ‘putting 
the field in motion’, new players and institutional entrepreneurship moulding 
the forces in the field. Subsequently, new order with justification and legitimacy 
evolves into a specific form that may disseminate among the field forming a 
renewed institutional constitution. Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) distinguish 
four perspectives of this kind of institutional change: design, adaptation, diffusion 
and collective action. All these answer to different questions: what is the individual 
actor’s influence on the institutional arrangement, how organisations adapt to their 
institutional environments, how institutions reproduce in an organisational field, 
and how institutions emerge to facilitate or constrain action, respectively. Be it 
collective purposeful actions or individual entrepreneurship, already-made choices 
open up new possibilities as well as restrict future choices (Bonoli & Palier 2007). 
The actors within a field constantly need to reaffirm their position in the field by 
diverting resources, maintaining legitimacy and securing favourable rules. Although 
we are not directly testing these kinds of specific models in our enquiry but rely 
on exploratory analysis, we recognise that the current state of affairs in a field can 
never be taken as given but as snapshots of a process. This is why we have selected 
an approach that is both historically sensitive and highly actor and action centred.
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3 Institutions and Governance in  
 Public-Private Pension Provision 
In this chapter, we discuss the question of how to study governance in the organisation 
field level so that it can be applied to pension provision. We argue pension provision 
can be best understood in these terms as the institutional organisation of pension 
policy, which not only implements policies but also conditions policy-making 
with specified relations systems. We use the conventional institutional policy 
process model to highlight how the field conditions different stages of pension 
policy. In this model, there are four somewhat self-explanatory stages: formation, 
coordination, implementation and control. Using more recent terminology (see 
Carmel & Papadopoulos 2003), the formation of the field answers to the question 
‘what is to be governed’, whereas the answer to the question ‘how is it governed’ 
includes issues related to policy coordination, implementation and operative control 
within the field. We recognise institutionalists, most importantly Peters (1992), have 
criticised the conventional model for being too linear and top-down oriented, and 
for building on the idea that policies get formulated and implemented ‘technically’ 
in a relational vacuum. However, we are not considering this formulation a rigorous 
theoretical framework or even heuristic theoretical tool for policy analysis, but 
only a narrative tool for presenting empirical findings on how field level logics of 
governance frame and for instance cause tensions in different domains of pension 
politics. The policy process we have studied in fact diverges from the pure policy 
process model. We recognise a field of pension provision can always include 
formal and informal logics that do not always coincide, bottom-up processes that 
are relationally contingent, and various other relational dynamics as our theoretical 
framework presented in the previous section well illustrates. The policy model is 
thus used only to bring the narrative on field-level governance issues in PPP type 
pension schemes closer to the public policy narratives that have tended to dominate 
the research on first pillar pension scheme administration.
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Public Administration and Corporate Governance
The primary theoretical issue in this study is to address the governance of PPPs in an 
area that has hardly ever been analysed in those terms. The distinction of public and 
private forms of governance characterises many current pension policy processes 
and schemes well, as it was noted in the introduction. Public administration and 
private sector corporate governance are traditionally considered very different 
kinds of types of governance in terms of products, goals, ownership, mutual 
relationships of actors, sources of finance, political influence, coerciveness, and 
scopes of impacts. In these terms derived from comparative organisation theory 
literature, the two ideal types of organisation field frames provide quite different 
spaces for policy-making, which are summarised in Table 1. The differences may 
be quite fundamental in defining change processes in pension policies – business 
models and purchasing behaviour of insurance policies are very different from 
collective deliberation for public policy formation, price competition from budgeted 
collaboration in coordination, shareholder or fiduciary driven implementation 
from public body execution, and consumer choice from democratic supervision in 
control, to mention a few issues.
Table 1. Field-level frames in the ideal types of public administration and corporate 
governance (inspired by Nutt & Backoff 1992).
Public administration Corporate governance
Markets Oversight bodies behave as 
markets
Purchasing behaviour  
defines markets
Mutual relationships of 
key actors
Collaboration among  
organisations offering a 
given service
Competition among  
organisations offering a 
given service
Source of finance Financing by budgets Financing by fees and 
charges
Political influence Buffering to deal with  
influence attempts
Political influence handled 
as exceptions
Coerciveness Mandatory funding and use Voluntary consumption and 
payment on use
Scope of impact Broad, considerable societal 
impact
Narrow, little societal impact
Ownership Citizens Stockholders
Goals and performance 
expectations
Ambiguous and changing Clear and stable
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It must be noted that there are various characteristics that may penetrate or supersede 
both these conceptualisations in the field level analysis, which suggests that a 
more nuanced approach to empirical research than mere testing of these ideal type 
characteristics is very likely required (and which has indeed been adopted in this 
study) in any research setting. Take collaboration between key actors in institutional 
work efforts. Collaboration is not based on price-mechanisms or hierarchical 
relationships but is negotiated in an ongoing communicative process (Hardy, 
Phillips et al. 2003). Collaborative relationships also highlight local institutional 
conditions as contrast to more globalised market transactions. Within institutional 
fields, boundary issues connect collaboration with power. The definition of issues, 
existing collaborative practices and political activity of the participants define 
outside and insider roles in the collaborative process. The collaborative process 
reproduces and transforms rules and resource allocations within the field. The most 
powerful actors equipped with formal authority, control of critical resources and 
discursive legitimacy are able to define the problems, interpretation of the issues, 
membership and legitimate practices that will privilege their own position (Phillips, 
Lawrence et al. 2000). This battle over normative authority can happen as much 
in horizontally competitive market conditions as in vertically organised agencies.
In context of mandatory pension provision, the organisations within the fields of 
pension provision are traditionally considered extensions of public pension policies 
according to the public administration framework: they function as government 
agencies (or other public bodies). These agencies are intended to implement, 
execute and administrate law, which sets them apart from privately owned firms 
and other non-profit organisations (Gortner, Mahler et al. 1997). The unifying 
features of agencies include some degree of autonomy from political direction, a 
pre-established strategic direction through political decision, budgeting autonomy, 
financing from a combination of its own revenues, earmarked contributions and 
subsidies from the state budget, publicly-owned assets, and public accountability 
defined by law and tradition (OECD 2001). 
As it was noted, however, many mandatory schemes now include private 
elements. Pension governance in the private sector might be quite different not only 
from public pension provision but also from other private sector activities. It may 
also include a variety of logics of private governance. For example, in the Anglo-
American world trust-based, fiduciary duty bound pension funds with their specific 
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history and tradition (see e.g. Clark 2000; Langbein 1997; Montagne 2007) are by 
far the essential actors in second pillar pensions rather than insurance companies 
to which only a part of pension savings are outsourced as annuities. Pension funds 
are not exactly competing mutually against each other since they execute different 
schemes; rather, it is the available savings schemes that are competing. This implies 
that pension funds are directly competing against the option of outsourcing saving 
to the third pillar, to personal pension savings (e.g. IRAs and mutual funds in the 
US) where corporate governance prevails over fiduciary management.
As noted, the presence of multiple logics of administration in a field is essential 
for understanding the field-level logic of governance. The example above for 
example suggests similar pension funds may have similar interests in terms of 
collective competition against other actors in the field. However, also the variety 
of organisational forms and the dominant organisational types in the fields are 
essential in characterising field relations. In our Finnish case study, the dominant 
actors are special-purpose insurance companies. This is the reason why we have 
anchored our point of comparison to a broad definition of corporate governance 
applicable to insurance companies than any more specific definitions of private 
sector governance like fiduciary management. Yet it is not to say that organisational 
forms exclusively characterise the field-level governance logics that are equally 
much influenced by the question of what exactly are the institutions of field that 
are to be governed. The frames of competition or collaboration between key actors, 
and budgetary or fee-based financing might for example get very different forms 
and meanings in defined benefit and defined contribution, or in partly and fully 
funded pension schemes.
One key thematic issue of formal governance in context of European PPPs 
in pension provision is financialisation of pensions (Dixon 2008; Dixon & 
Sorsa 2009). Especially in European countries, the institutions of private financial 
portfolio management have penetrated pension provision in various countries as 
partial and full funding has become more common. The change paths towards new 
administration logics have greatly differed in different institutional contexts. The 
new governance systems don’t necessarily represent completely new institutional 
orders but rather are embedded in and may even reinforce the existing ones (see 
Dixon & Sorsa 2009). Although some scholars (notably Gordon L. Clark, e.g. 2003) 
have studied various aspects of pension governance of funded schemes in Europe, 
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pension fund governance remains an issue that has this far raised only scant 
attention in social sciences, not only in Europe but in Anglo-American literature 
as well (Monk 2009). Whilst European pension studies have mostly focused on 
pension regimes and politics, there have been no large-scale empirical studies on 
European pension governance that have taken the changes in formal governance 
introduced by funding or changing investment methods into account. This said, 
there are studies that have taken a more systematic theoretical view on investment 
management and regulation in context of European pension schemes (see e.g. 
Boeri, Bovenberg et al. 2006). 
Pillars, Tiers, and Pension Governance
The example of financialisation is somewhat illustrating in underlining the 
theoretical gaps in studies on pension governance. One possible reason behind this 
bias is the variety of essential institutions that are not only thought to characterise 
governance of pension provision in ideal type regimes but also conditions and limits 
the academic thinking on governance logics. Perhaps the most important one is 
the classic discursive framework of World Bank’s three pillars, which has direct 
consequences for understanding governance. First pillar pension schemes (e.g. 
flat, means-tested, earnings-related or universal) are supposedly administered by 
public bodies. Second pillar schemes earnings-related schemes based on individual 
or collective labour market arrangements and executed by companies (e.g. in 
forms of book reserves), separate pension funds or outsourced financial sector 
actors. Third pillar pensions are about private supplementary pensions paid by 
individuals and administered by selected private entities. Lately, the Bank has shifted 
towards a model including more pillars with less clear or implicit assumptions on 
administrative templates (Holzmann & Palmer 2006).
Although we argue the lack of rigorous framework for addressing governance 
forms and practices is a central theoretical gap that makes the old three-pillar division 
obsolete, the pillar model has been driven to a crisis much more by empirical facts 
in this thematic area. The most important challenge concerning pillar typologies in 
Europe and the European Union, whose legislation strongly relies on the three-pillar 
model, is the fact that many public pension schemes include private administration 
and execution. This has been very problematic from the EU legislation perspective 
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leaving the pillar in which a scheme belongs a matter of interpretation, which has for 
example brought first-pillar systems not in EU competency within its interpretative 
horizon. Most importantly, the regulation 1408/71 is currently interpreted so that 
it includes all kinds of public-private mixes, which has completely blurred the 
first and second pillar division in respect to various schemes (see Briganti 2008). 
As result, there have been calls for more research attention on the governance of 
pensions-related PPPs (European Commission 2008).
The current trend of seeing pension systems through pillars and tiers at least 
implicitly recognizes the division of private and public administration within 
pillars. There is much variation in these conceptualisations. Table 2 provides one 
influential handbook categorisation. The division of pillars to layers or tiers has had 
much analytical value especially in comparative analyses, and the differentiation 
has been firmly tied to the research question posed. For example, in a recent review 
of OECD countries (excluding Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria), 
Whiteford and Whitehouse (2006) divided the first pillar only to two tiers: first tier 
safety nets to prevent old-age poverty and second tier arrangements that guarantee 
an adequate replacement rate for the earnings during the working life. These tiers 
included a number of differences. The first tier could take a form of basic flat rate 
schemes guaranteeing minimum pension (often tied to earnings-related pensions) or 
general social assistance for poor relief without specific connection to age (Germany 
until 2006). In the second tier, the most common schemes were DB plans. In these 
plans, the working life contributions and some measure of individual earnings 
defined the amount employee receives in retirement. The second most common 
scheme was the defined contribution (DC) plan in which employees deposit their 
contributions to individual accounts. The retirement income constitutes from the 
accumulated capital and investment returns of the contributions. Notional or non-
financial DC (NDC) is a modification to pure DC scheme, and it could also be 
found from various schemes.
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Table 2. Generic description of pension systems via pillars and tiers.
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar
Third tier (e.g. Swedish individual 
funded accounts)
Voluntary 
occupational 
pensions (e.g. UK)
Voluntary private 
pension (life 
insurance)
Second tier Earnings-related part 
of pensions (e.g. 
French supplementary 
occupational pension 
schemes) for employees 
and/or self-employed
Government-
subsidised 
occupational 
pension (e.g. Danish 
tax deductible 
occupational 
pension schemes)
Government-
subsidised private 
pension (e.g. 
German Riester-
Rente)
First tier Basic pension (e.g. Irish 
flat-rate) for employees, 
self-employed, farmers 
and/or civil servants
Mandatory 
occupational 
pension (e.g. Swiss 
second pillar or de 
facto mandatory 
Dutch occupational 
pensions)
Mandatory 
private pension 
(e.g. Portuguese 
Plafonamento)
Means-tested part (e.g. 
Swedish guarantee 
pension)
Social assistance (e.g. 
German social assistance 
substitutes for minimum 
pensions)
Source: Immergut & Anderson (2007).
From a governance perspective, these kinds of conceptualisations provide us little 
help for choosing the starting point for analysing governance. The pillars denote 
the separate modes (i.e. collective public, collective or individual labour market, 
and individual basis) of ‘issue ownership’ but tell us little about what these ‘issues’ 
(e.g. investments, accounting, information exchange and mediation) are, and 
almost nothing about what ‘ownership’ means in terms of practices in different 
arrangements (e.g. centralisation vs. decentralisation, fiduciary vs. corporate 
management). The tiers give us more detailed view on the insurance paradigm 
and deepen our understanding on different locations for ‘issue ownership’ but 
do not address how contributions, benefits and (possibly) funding are organised, 
which is an essential question in defining contextual differences in governance. For 
example, the definition of benefits is essential in the Anglo-American institutional 
context (for overview and history, see Clark 2000), as DB and DC schemes differ 
in governance and decision-making in case of investments. Yet it tells us very little 
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if or how these issues are relevant in non-Anglo-American funds in general and 
PPPs in particular. We argue these broadly shared discourses of pension provision 
are rather directing the focus away from governance issues and thus cannot serve 
as the point of departure for governance analysis as such.
European Pensions and Organisation Fields:  
Some Hypotheses
Despite scant attention on governance practices, the academic literature on European 
pension policies offers some important insights and hypotheses for organisation 
field level analysis besides denoting potential divisions of labour between different 
schemes. Firstly, pension policies have been largely a national issue in Europe, and 
most important policy pressures for changes in governance systems are relatively 
likely coming from the government than for example from the European Union. EU 
has played a relatively minor role in market-based second and third pillar pension 
schemes that are subject to community law (Eckhardt 2005). The open method of 
coordination in European social policy issues is likely to have a small impact on 
national pension policies in an area in which European integration weak as such 
(De la Porte & Pochet 2002). Put differently, although the European legal regime 
frames policies, there are few or no European wide pension policies but instead a 
multitude of individual state and state policy embedded fields of pension provision. 
Despite this lack of central coordination, recent reviews of European pension 
system reforms (Zaidi, Marin et al. 2006; see also Vidlund 2006) show that many 
EU countries have applied similar reform measures in the last fifteen years or so. 
Most of these reforms have been parametric, influencing the variables defining 
size and scope of the system, rather than systemic reforms that alter the structure 
of the pension system. The parametric reforms in 25 EU countries since 1995 have 
included changes (number of countries in parentheses) in retirement age (16), 
contribution rate (14), contribution requirements (12), benefit indexation (6), and 
pension formulae (15) (Zaidi, Marin et al. 2006). 
The state-centred bias and the type of reforms suggest that national pension 
systems are potentially legitimate, diffused and path-dependent in different ways, 
implying among other things that institutional change paths are strongly conditioned 
35FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
even when not necessarily path-dependent (for discussion, see Dixon & Sorsa 2009). 
This increases focus on the questions of what exactly are the contents of the 
institutional life of a particular field and what its actual capabilities for innovation 
with governance efforts are like. In addition, it highlights different frameworks 
for common problems. For example, financial challenges of European pension 
schemes in condition of ageing population are very well documented (see e.g. 
Nyce & Schieber 2005). Indeed, cost-efficiency is a crucial issue in achieving 
legitimacy, which has many implications for governance practices. For example, 
prefunding has been considered a feasible strategy to buffer increasing pension 
costs of the future and to manage risks via dependence of global financial markets 
rather than national economies (Clark 2003). It is, however, possible that poor 
investment management and relative returns, negative general market development, 
and high administrative cost of the pension funds actually decrease the level of the 
retirement income (DC) or increases the costs (DB). A shift in plan type does not 
very likely reduce the overall cost of ageing population (Thompson 2001), which 
implies the issue is likely present in governance of various schemes although in 
different forms. In brief, some internationally shared issues and change processes 
are important as shared macro-level institutional frames, but tend to get different 
articulations in a variety of more or less strongly institutionalised organisation 
fields whose boundaries are national or otherwise more local than these frames.
Secondly, the essential actors within pension fields are very likely the same in 
most European pension systems. The government and the labour market partners 
representing employee and employer organisations constitute the core actors 
forming pension policies. These are also the collective representatives of the 
main contributors of the costs. Whilst common cost pressures, likely institutional 
diffusion and potential path dependencies highlight the need to focus on the nature of 
institutional life, having the same key actors is very relevant concerning institutional 
work. However, the consequences of institutional work practiced by least 
surprising partners might provide most surprising outcomes in terms of governance 
(re)formation. Illustrative examples of these results are the German pension funds 
Chemiepensionsfonds and MetallRente, the former formed by social partners in 
the chemical industry (IG BCE and BAVC) and the latter by partners in metal 
industry (IG Metall and Gesamtmetall) (see Dixon 2008; Dixon & Sorsa 2009). 
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The funds compete against large financial conglomerates and other funds. Now, 
the social partners are for the first time ‘around the same board table’ managing 
and outsourcing investments, administrating pension flows, marketing, and doing 
other relevant everyday tasks of finance sector business management.
Before going to our case analysis we summarise this section by noting that the 
discussion above provides some important points of focus concerning institutional 
work, institutional change and deinstitutionalising pressures in pension provision. 
In terms of institutional work, the efforts to change pension governance are 
essentially tied to strongly institutionalised power relations between traditional 
actors (i.e. labour market partners, political parties, government, businesses) but 
also to new possibilities and capabilities brought by new domains like the financial 
sector. Secondly, the institutional change in governance cultures (i.e. identities 
and schema) is very likely related to significant systemic or parametric changes 
(e.g. prefunding) in strongly institutionalised pension schemes and regimes, or 
to emergence of new organisations and alliances (e.g. German funds). Thirdly, 
the regulative and normative deinstitutionalisation pressures of governance are 
mostly endogenous rather than exogenous to the governance regimes bounding 
the fields with the potential exception of major changes in EU regulations. In the 
field level this means that tensions in institutional life are more likely to serve as 
pressures for change than any ‘leaking’ boundaries would (again with the exception 
of changes in macro-level regulative frameworks). In discursive terms, however, 
the institutionalised ways of thinking about pension provision may provide some 
templates that cannot fit all existing tensions and thus give grounds for discursive 
deinstitutionalisation and increase potential for institutional change.
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4 Finnish Earnings-Related Pension Regime: 
 Actors and Basic Characteristics
The Finnish earnings-related pension system has been called a hybrid combining 
some elements of the Swedish model – basic pension security for all with earnings-
related benefits on top for those with an employment record – and the decentralised 
Central-European ‘corporatist model’ (Hinrichs & Kangas 2003). For heuristic 
purposes it could be argued that the second pillar of most European pension 
regimes is legislated in the first pillar in Finland. As result, Finland is the only 
European country in which also the third pillar is more popular than the second. 
In contrast to Sweden, the lack of ceiling in statutory pension benefits has often 
presented to have crowded out the need for supplementary pension arrangements 
in Finland (Lundqvist 1998). The Finnish earnings-related private sector workers’ 
pension scheme TEL was established in 1961 and enforced in 1962. Employees 
on short-term contracts (LEL) (1961), farmers (1974), other self-employed (YEL) 
(1974) and artists (TaEL) (1986) got their own separate mandatory programmes. 
TEL, LEL and TaEL schemes were merged into one scheme, TyEL, in 2007. The 
pension programmes for public employees (one for central government employees 
and one for municipal employees) existed already before TEL and have remained 
separate schemes. The TyEL scheme covers regular old-age pensions, early and 
deferred old-age pensions, part-time pensions, disability pensions, partial disability 
pensions, cash rehabilitation benefit, partial cash rehabilitation benefit, rehabilitation 
assistance and survivors’ pensions.
TyEL somewhat evades classification with pillars and tiers. From the perspective 
of a pension insurance scheme, it is a first-pillar, second tier, mandatory, defined-
benefit, partly funded2 – one fourth of inflowing contributions are funded and the 
current total funding ratio is around 36% – but primarily pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
reliant pension scheme co-sponsored by employers and employees. The state 
funding of TyEL scheme is at best marginal. The reason that makes the TyEL 
scheme difficult to classify is the fact that it is executed by decentralised private 
2 The scheme can be better described partly funded than prefunded since the funds are 
not intended to be wound up during the baby boomer retirement but to be stabilised 
in size and to continue generating investment returns to lower pension contributions 
in longer term.
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pension providers. There are three available types of authorised pension providers: 
pension insurance companies (PICs, työeläkevakuutusyhtiö, 7 in2010), company 
pension funds (eläkesäätiö; 7 ‘B-funds’ executing TyEL and the scheme for self-
employed YEL, 17 ‘AB-funds’ executing TyEL, YEL and voluntary second-pillar 
pensions in 2009), or industry-wide pension funds (eläkekassa, 8 executing TyEL/
YEL in 2009). Employers select the pension provider for their employees.
Traditionally large companies have had their own company funds, whilst most 
companies and almost all small companies have insured their employees through 
PICs (Puttonen & Torstila 2003). Currently, the vast majority of insurances and 
assets are in PICs, the two largest PICs Varma and Ilmarinen covering policies on 
about one half of all the insured. In historical terms, this is an interesting peculiarity. 
As Pentikäinen (1997) argued, if PICs would not have been forced to the so-called 
automatic premium lending (see next section), pension funds would very likely 
have become the dominant actors in pension provision, as was the case still in 
1950s, when company funds provided pension for twice as many employees as 
industry-wide funds and six times more than insurance companies. Although the 
success PICs was everything but obvious for instance due to loose management, 
they had superior technical capabilities to handle massive inflows of information 
the mandatory TEL scheme produced (ibid.). In this sense, the main battle over 
organisational forms of authorised pension providers has already been fought: only 
the remnants of the funds remain while PICs rule.
The mandatory nature of the TyEL scheme dictates a number of fixed issues 
that are typically variable in many other countries, most importantly the ‘pension 
product’, i.e. the insurance contract defining pension benefits and pension provider 
liabilities. This suggests the object of governance is perhaps more limited than in a 
number of other pension fields.  Finnish businesses are required to take a pension 
insurance policy and if they fail to do so, a semi-public authority, The Finnish 
Centre for Pensions (Eläketurvakeskus, hence: ETK), takes it for the employer. The 
benefits are defined in a fixed and somewhat complex manner (see Hietaniemi & 
Ritola 2007 for a detailed account). Since 2005, the pension rights have accrued at 
the rate of 1.5 per cent on the earnings for each year in employment between the 
ages of 18 and 53, after which the accrual rate is 1.9 per cent until the age of 63 
and 4.5 per cent until the age of 68 (the latter typically called ‘super accrual rate’ in 
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public debate). Pensions accrued during the work history and pensions in payment 
after retirement are automatically re-valued in line with an index that is determined 
on the basis of changes in the earnings level and consumer prices. 
The pension providers make pension decisions but otherwise they have little 
or no individual effect to the pension policy implementation in the field, which is 
rather a matter of macro-level coordination. The assets generated by the scheme, 
however, bring much contingency in defining the object of field governance also 
in the implementation level. The authorised pension providers legally own all the 
assets: they are just required to collect contributions and pay benefits by the law. 
Investments are perhaps the most important thematic field from the perspective of 
governing pension provision implementation, and there are extensive regulations 
concerning this field as well.
The TyEL scheme administration includes many relevant primary actors, whose 
organisational forms and mutual relationships we discuss in the next section. The 
highest regulative power over the scheme is held by the parliament, which sets the 
laws on which the scheme is based. There have been and are various temporary and 
more or less permanent ad hoc groups, committees and other bodies that prepare 
reform suggestions, make statements on development needs and clarify system 
characteristic interpretations if needed, although ETK and pension providers are 
in principle responsible for preparing regulation. These groups have been often 
set by different actors; the parliament, The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
(hence: STM), or labour market partners. STM supervises and coordinates many 
variables of the scheme, and is in principle albeit not in practice, as we will see, 
in control of a significant number of features. The semi-public ETK is the primary 
body mediating and storing various kinds of information especially on pension 
contributions and accrued benefits. The largest central employee (SAK, STTK, 
AKAVA) and employer (EK) organisations are the most important labour market 
actors in the field. 
The pension providers (PICs and both fund types) make pension decisions, and 
turn pension contributions into invested assets, through which they cover funded 
and PAYG parts of pension benefits (liabilities). The Finnish Financial Authority 
(Finanssivalvonta, hence: FIN-FSA) regulates pension provider investments and 
other operations. The Finnish Pension Alliance (Työeläkevakuuttajat, hence: TELA) 
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is the ‘industry association’ of pension providers and coordinates their common 
opinion-formation in reform committees among other tasks. Eläkesäätiöyhdistys 
is the industry association of funds, although it also belongs to TELA. The PICs 
collectively own a reinsurance company called Garantia Ltd, and private and public 
pension providers in cooperation with ETK the Arek Ltd, a developer of pension 
information systems. ETK, TELA and The Bank of Finland create statistics and 
conduct research on the scheme. 
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5 Governing Pension Provision: 
 The TyEL Policy Process
One of the many reports (Kausto 2002) addressing the TyEL system development 
posed the question of where is the nexus of the system and explicitly responded: 
nowhere and everywhere. Indeed, no single actor in the field – the government, the 
parliament, ministries, administrative agencies, labour-market partners or pension 
providers – have an absolute say in the functioning of administration or in reforming 
the pension system. It is, rather, a field of intersecting forces. As we will see in this 
chapter, the point of gravitation is nevertheless tilted towards the labour-market 
side of the TyEL universe. The following subsections are divided according to the 
stages – formation, coordination, implementation and control – of institutional 
policy process model to provide a narrative for pension provision governance. The 
discussion of institutional life of governance is either actor or mechanism specific, 
depending on whether the mechanism presented concerns more than one actor. 
Furthermore, most actors appear in more than one process stage.
We start this chapter by presenting the historical and current institutional life of 
field formation. In the further process stages we focus less on historical backgrounds 
due to observation that there aren’t that many major institutional changes in these 
stages relevant in leading to the current institutional life that have not been already 
accounted to the changes in formation. Whenever the changes have been relevant, 
they are discussed in more detail. Besides presenting the relational systems between 
different actors in each stage of the policy process, we discuss issues related to 
institutional boundaries, work and entrepreneurship in these stages.
Formation
The first seeds for the TEL scheme can be found in pacts between labour market 
partners of previous years, but the earnings-related pensions were primarily 
on agenda in a national pension policy design board in mid-1950s (see e.g. 
Salminen 1987; Niemelä 1994). The original TEL system design was based on 
four-year-long committee preparation that started in 1956. It included government 
authorities, labour market organisations and members of parliament from 
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government-forming political parties. The process was slow and there was great 
dissent on issues like financing arrangements and more general resistance by the 
employers towards statutory schemes (Salminen 1987). The committee report was 
turned into a parliament motion but not a government bill because the agrarian 
minority government wasn’t willing to give one. The report was directly opposed 
only by the extreme left (SKDL), processed very fast (in two months) in 1961, and 
put in effect as law from 1962 onwards. The original formation process was not 
simply a struggle between the right and the left with labour market organisations 
each taking their sides, but for instance between industry workers and agrarian 
population and within the left. It also included very much tactical politicking and 
observation of Sweden’s experiences in the ATP scheme creation. 
In Finnish public policy, TEL ‘began an era in which the labour market 
organisations were actively involved in the shaping of social policy and development 
of social security based on the insurance principle took centre stage’ (Niemelä & 
Salminen 1999). Within two decades from the birth of the scheme, labour market 
organisations consolidated their role as the main drivers of the scheme. Conflicts 
and collaboration between central employer and employee organisations have 
been the main causes for various governance reforms. Until mid-1970s, the issues 
were typically renegotiated in the general incomes policy settlement (TUPO, 
Tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu, a tripartite economic policy-setting arena)
In the TUPO of 1974 both labour market parties agreed that labour market party 
representation would be negotiated in coordination with the structural predecessor 
of TELA (then Työeläkelaitosten liitto), the pension provider interest group. 
Investment policies and principles were to be discussed in advisory boards, both 
general and provider-specific. Many variables of the TEL scheme were also legally 
codified during the following decades. As one interviewee put it, the labour market 
pension agreement was only given ‘legal guarantees’, not a mandate for the state 
to intervene in scheme formation. One commentator has stated that labour market 
parties make the agreements but the ‘notes [on these agreements] have been made 
in form of law’ (Louekoski 1997). As Kangas (2007) puts it, this illustrates the 
paradigm of ‘markets against the politics’ in contrast to the classic understanding 
of Nordic welfare regimes as ‘politics against markets’. The understanding of TyEL 
formation as a matter of labour market agreement is very broadly shared not only 
historically but within the current field as well.
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The nature of political conflict in the original formation of TEL continues to explain 
many of today’s governance characteristics, most importantly decentralisation. The 
Finnish employer-dominated solution would rely on regulated corporate governance 
rather than public control and on multiple alternatives for privately owned provision 
rather than centralised public organisation of the Swedish allied labour union and 
government dictated solution (Salminen 1987). Here, the example of Swedish 
pension policy development served as a point of learning for the employer side 
rather than as a source of mimetic behaviour. Indeed, also the pension providers 
have been reluctant to allow any state representation in their governance ever since 
(Louekoski 2005). Decentralisation is considered a virtue in the field compared to 
state control. Both the labour market actors and pension providers have regarded the 
attempts to increase political influence in pension policies as attempts to ‘socialise’ 
the pension system. One informant formulated this normative position well by saying 
that ‘the most common threat to pension funds in the world is the finance ministers’. 
While the decentralised system served to distance pension system from political 
influence, the decentralisation also hindered the formation of a single large capital 
base, which if in hands of employees would have created ‘pension socialism’ – a 
phenomenon greatly feared by employers in all Nordic countries (Overbye 1996) 
– or ‘pension fund socialism’ (see Langley 2008b). 
Nevertheless, the buffering of political influence in the TyEL scheme is selective, 
since some political interests get more room or are better pronounced than others. 
Traditionally, the largest employee association (SAK) has strong links to left-wing 
parties in general and the social democrat party (SDP) in particular, and employer 
peak association (EK) is connected to the conservative party (Kokoomus). In this 
way, the centre party (Keskusta) that has strong links to agrarian interests – and 
has served these by promoting a strong basic pension system – but not to general 
employee or employer organisations, has been excluded from the governance of 
pension providers. Since the three major parties have for some time had roughly 
equal support and number of seats in the parliament, it is very difficult for any of 
the three major parties to form a majority government on its own. It also seems to 
be a lock-in situation from the centre party perspective: they are not likely to get 
strong support for institutional work efforts from either social democrats or the 
conservatives should they try to increase their influence in pension policy by a 
major systemic change. To put it in institutional terms, the conservative party and 
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social-democratic party have an established interaction project through their labour 
market partners, which cannot be broken easily.
Limited Institutionalisation and Differentiated Lives
The focus on formal regulative decision-making structures of formation and 
coordination, according to which all preparation is made by STM and decisions 
made by the parliament, does not take into account that the actual preparation and 
key normative decisions, which have this far dictated the parliamentary ‘rubber-
stamp’ decisions, have already been made outside democratic arenas. Indeed, 
TyEL formation cannot be explained only in terms of parliamentary governance. 
However, nor can it be explained by decisions made by other static bodies. 
Whilst coordination, which we discuss in the next section, is now somewhat 
institutionalised albeit functionally divided into many coordinating bodies from 
macro to micro level, the policy formation level ‘meta-governance’ cannot always 
be located to institutionalised bodies or schema. In contrast, there have been many 
ad hoc committees or groups finding grounds for or directly preparing reforms in 
TEL/TyEL formation.
The best known of these ad hoc groups was the so-called Puro workgroup, 
named after PIC Ilmarinen CEO Kari Puro who chaired the meetings, which was 
more formally called the ‘Pensions negotiation group of central labour market 
organisations’ (Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä). The 
group was formed in early 1990s to discuss the sharing of contributions between 
employers and employees (which came in effect in 1993). The group comprised 
of all central labour market organisation representatives as primary members and 
the CEOs of the two biggest PICs as expert advisors. Puro group was powerful in 
setting the future agendas for TyEL scheme with its consensual outcomes that even 
the parliament refused to denounce. It has been often argued in popular media that 
‘the politicians gave the power’ to the group that has was sometimes called ‘pensions 
mafia’ (Seies 2006). The group was originally based on purely informal normative 
mandate but then given a formal regulative role. In 1995, minister Sinikka Mönkäre 
of STM gave a mandate to create a report on how to develop TEL investments 
(see Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä 1996). The group 
achieved a strong status as an able institutional entrepreneur (Dixon & Sorsa 2009). 
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The investment rule reforms of 1997 and 2007 were both negotiated in and by the 
group with broader but field-insider-dominated expert group consultation.
Mr. Matti Louekoski of Bank of Finland has also been an important person in ad 
hoc re-formation efforts – ‘a one-man working group’ as often portrayed in public 
debate – but less an institutional entrepreneur. He was the responsible author of the 
report (Louekoski 1996) on the general legal mandate of the pension provision in 
mid-1990s (finished in 1997). The main mandate was to clarify the organisational 
independence and the endogenisation of risks to operational management in the 
conditions of EU membership and ambiguous corporate governance structures, 
which the collapse of PIC Eläke-Kansa belonging to social democratic financial 
block revealed (Louekoski 1997). Some parts of this process had however already 
been started in TUPO agreements of early 1990s. Again, this shows that there are 
virtually no state-led re-formation efforts that wouldn’t have been initiated by the 
labour market organisations.
Although there are many elements of path dependence like financial sustainability 
and normative legitimacy in the TyEL system, the re-formation efforts have not 
been characterised by overly strict discursive limitations. For example, in the 
preparations of the 1997 solvency and governance rule reforms, there were many 
potential investment governance formations on the negotiation table. There were 
at least four alternatives: the development of the existing system, the mutual 
investment fund model, the mutual PIC model, and the centralised state-led model 
(Louekoski 1997). Although the first option was in the end considered the best at 
that time, all the other models have been discursively present in debates for decades 
now. The mutual investment fund model has been brought up every time there’s 
talk about improving competition and different centralised models are discussed 
when competition has been seen as a problem (Rajaniemi 2007).
This said, the TyEL field governance lives very different institutional lives in the 
‘liability side’ and the ‘asset side’ of the formation. The most important variables 
adjusting the costs of and benefits provided by the system rely on either automatic 
adjustments or coordination stage parametric governance. This implies the formation 
of the field is quite flexible in terms of payments and liabilities, which undercuts 
the need for system-level reformation. Indeed, Finnish pension policy reforms 
have been by and large parametric, but the quality and even the sheer number of 
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these parametric reforms have shifted the whole policy paradigm (Hinrichs & 
Kangas 2003). In terms of policy process, the flexible coordination mechanisms 
have been more accountable of policy changes in pension benefits, conditions and 
costs than the formation mechanisms – or, that institutional entrepreneurship on 
many variables has been ‘written in’ the field governance. This suggests that the 
discursive life of re-formation efforts might be less important than the coordination 
and even in implementation level discursive frames. 
From the ‘asset side’ perspective of investment, however, coordination has been 
intentionally eliminated from the beginning so that aspired coordinative changes 
have always required system-level re-formation efforts. Perhaps most importantly, 
the 1997 investment reforms placed investments into central governance focus 
after a long break when previous dissent over investment governance was solved 
in 1970s. This change goes along a broader change in discursive understanding 
on investments. Prefunded PAYG was the clear choice for financing mechanism 
in the original design of the scheme, since shortage of financial resources was 
broadly considered a primary obstacle for investments and job creation in the 
Finnish economy, and high inflation a great incentive for borrowing. This provided 
an enormous incentive to create pension capital (Pentikäinen 1997). From an 
administrative perspective, TEL included existing company-based arrangements 
and insurance companies in the new statutory system over time (Lundqvist 1998). 
The companies were forced to so-called premium lending, the employer right to 
draw a large percentage of legally enforced contributions as cheap loans by paying 
contributions in bonds rather than cash (currently the contributions are paid and 
loan contracts made). 
This financial innovation was the most important investment vehicle for the 
TEL funds from the beginning all the way to the 1990s sometimes accounting for 
80–90% of all TEL investments. The main (non-premium-lending) investment 
method was target-specific strategic allocation of investment loans, whose goal 
was job creation and improvement of general employment rate according to public 
policy targets (Pentikäinen 1997), which was in line with the prefunded pension 
scheme perspective. In terms of governance, investment management had not been 
a major issue, because customer demand in practice dictated the investment targets 
– as one interviewee put it, there weren’t many people in PICs who ‘knew anything 
about investing’. Until 1997, the investments were controlled by tight solvency and 
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capital reserve rules, which was understandable in condition of joint liabilities. The 
popularity of premium loans vanished when the financial markets were opened in 
the late 1980s. This opened up a brief vacuum in investment allocation paradigm, 
but the deep recession of early 1990s filled the vacuum when TEL capital basically 
saved the state struggling with expensive bank bailouts and high unemployment 
from bankruptcy by buying sovereign bonds with a massive relative allocation. 
Financing the state was considered inconsistent with the purpose of TEL capital by 
almost the whole field, which lead to the Puro group reform mandate to be drafted.
Although the 1997 reform was technically minor and would hardly require 
years of re-formation bargaining, the conventional interpretation on the goal of 
1997 solvency rule reform was to change the investment paradigm by increasing 
international and riskier investments in order to lower the future costs of the 
scheme (Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä 1996) – which 
could have hardly happened unless PICs had quickly adopted a new investment 
paradigm (Dixon & Sorsa 2009) – instead of using capital to implement national 
economic policy via privately owned pension capital. At the same time, the 
Louekoski report was directly addressing TEL governance. The reform clarified 
the relationship between PICs and other actors. In case of company groups, “the 
financial conglomerates”, pension provision was to be accounted separately from 
other activities and pension assets were separated from other assets. Investments 
could be delegated to external managers, but in every case the PICs were required 
sufficient internal management to ensure proper control over capital. Generally 
speaking, the governance of and regulation over pension provision became more 
investment-focused than ever before.
Formation Boundaries and Institutional Change
There are various macro-level boundaries present in the field formation. The most 
prevalent force in relation to pension policy environment is the European Union 
decision making.  Although Finland gained an exception from the life insurance 
directive for the private implementation of TyEL in ground of execution of a public 
policy when the country joined EU, some of the developments within the EU and in 
other EU countries set the TyEL system into a new kind of scrutiny. For an example 
of EU development, the future of the services directive orienting the provision of 
services in EU countries could gradually affect the social security arrangements 
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such as TyEL pensions (Kari & Pakaslahti 2003). In case of the latter concern, 
more European countries show features of the Finnish mixed public-private system 
of pension provision, which provides pressures of rethinking of EU regulations. 
In this respect, the idiosyncrasy of TyEL scheme serves rather as an example of 
national ‘exceptionalism’ than EU integration, and it may incite new forms of EU 
regulation. EU legislation serves as a general deinstitutionalising threat to the field. 
This said, many of our interviewees considered EU regulation a rather distant threat 
of mainly scholarly importance. 
Although distant to the practitioners in the field the threats included in the changes 
in EU regulations concern the very architecture of the system. The most essential 
thematic challenge is the unclear lines between competition and collaboration. The 
legislation on competition applicable to legally authorised pension providers refers 
primarily to the stipulations provided by the Treaty Establishing the European 
Union and secondarily the national Act on restriction of competition. The tension 
with EU is rooted in the government aims at harmonising the latter Act with EU 
law (Hietaniemi & Ritola 2007). Put bluntly, the competition must be carefully 
defined and limited so that EU regulations would not apply, although legislation 
in general is aligned with the regulations. The possibility of external threat in this 
thematic area of macro-level regulative ‘rules of the game’ is acknowledged in most 
of the reports made within the field. There have been two main types of suggested 
actions should there be a strong force requiring systemic change. According to the 
first type, a single (public or private) provider could execute pension provision 
(Kausto 2002). The possibility of removing competition via monopoly was recently 
brought to public attention by the retired head of STM insurance department, Tarmo 
Pukkila, who heavily criticised the current form competition between pension 
providers as ‘waste of money’ (Iivonen 2009). According to the other type, pension 
provision could be centralised but assets then externalised to multiple investment 
funds, which would clarify the boundaries for and change the actors participating 
in competition (Rajaniemi 2007).
The essential boundaries for and logics of governance in the field have been drawn 
by the labour market parties, which has created a strong normative understanding 
who should be ‘in charge’ of the system-level characteristics. In contrast to the 
common first-pillar second-tier classification, the TyEL scheme is by and large 
understood as a labour market second pillar scheme with legislated formal mandate 
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and guarantee, and on which decision-making can be legitimately made only by the 
private labour market parties. Perhaps the most important boundary is the active 
maintenance of immunity to state authority in the normative and regulative level. 
This boundary is explained in part by the legacy of fear over ‘pension socialism’ 
and political struggles to prevent it. As the editor in chief of the Työeläke magazine, 
the main professional magazine in the field put it: ‘[if] you regard earnings-related 
pension as an extension of salaries, it is in that case the money of labour market 
parties, of employers and of working people, which is managed by pension insurance 
companies. No government would in reality want to violently grab money that 
belongs to someone else.‘ (Kalliomäki 2009, translated by VS.)
The immunisation of state authority to pension policy in general was well 
illustrated in 2008-09 when the government suggested, as part of ‘social TUPO’ in 
the financial crisis, the mandatory retirement age to be raised in following years, 
and set a centre party led STM committee excluding the labour market parties to 
prepare new legislation to do this. Since most Finns do not exactly accept this policy 
– 61 % of population opposed the idea in 2007 (TELA 2007) – the introduction of 
policy change took place in an antagonistic normative environment. The central 
labour market organisations in both sides have, however, endorsed the idea of rising 
the retirement age. In fact, the CEO of the central employer association EK has 
promoted the idea of raising the minimum mandatory old-age retirement age from 
63 up to 67 years (Aaltonen 2009). Yet labour market parties in neither side could 
accept the government’s suggestion. The main employer association expressed 
that this was not something the government could do by its own right, and the 
blue-collar employer associations even gave an implicit threat of general strike 
in case the committee started working without labour market representation. The 
resolution between labour market parties and government (Keskusjärjestöjen ja 
hallituksen yhteisymmärrys eläkekiistan ratkaisemisesta. 2009) clearly stated that 
the central labour market organisation would dictate the ways in which the reforms 
were made and that the STM-led committee (meant to more or less permanently 
replace the previous Puro group) was unacceptable and was to be replaced by 
tripartite committee led by CEO Jukka Rantala of ETK (see next section) – not a 
ministry, PIC or labour market representative.
It is worth asking why exactly the parliamentary political system has been so 
incapable of breaking the boundary of labour market party dominance despite the 
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fact that the Finnish political regime has strengthened parliamentary power. Finnish 
parliamentary decision rules and the role of the president were altered in 1992 
(see Mattila 1997) and 2000 (see Nousiainen 2001), respectively. The changes in 
parliamentary decision rules diminished the possibilities of parliamentary minorities 
to postpone legislation in the parliament and the constitutional change increased the 
decision-making powers of the cabinet in the expense of the role of the president. 
As a consequence a cabinet holding a majority in the parliament has more powers 
than before to intervene in any societal matter, including pension policies. In 
practice, government attempts to modify pension system have not been successful 
if they have not included both the labour market partners whose conflicting political 
connections we discussed above. The increase in state authority would require 
either new political alliances in institutional work or very strong entrepreneurship 
in order to change the prevailing discursive understanding in the field.
One development related to constitutional change has been the questioning 
of system parameters based on constitutional grounds. The constitution is an 
endogenous regulative discourse affecting the societal legitimacy of actors. The 
Finnish Constitution dictates that only public authorities should be allowed to take 
care of the tasks that include significant use of public authority. The interpretation 
of the significance of public authority has been that it involves the use of physical 
force in dealing with citizens. A possible broadening of the conceptual area of 
‘significant public authority’ poses a direct challenge for the functioning of private 
pension providers (Louekoski 2005) as well as The Centre for Pensions that in fact 
possesses a mandate on the use of physical force as it holds a right to impose a search 
on the premises of the employer (Myllymäki 2009). The constitutional question 
can be considered a technical project in which institutional entrepreneurs work 
for the improvement of their own positions. In a broad issue such as interpretation 
of the Constitution, it is a matter of formation-level governance – pension system 
interactions in general rather than between individual actors in the field.
The combination of relative legitimacy and sustainability of the TyEL scheme 
is another reason for the lack of dissenting or antagonistic political intervention. 
If difficult decisions such as lowering benefits or raising the mandatory retirement 
age are to be made, politicians are not likely to claim credit for these measures but 
avoid blame by letting labour market partners decide on the major pension policy 
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issues. The development in Bismarckian pension regimes illustrates that lack of 
trade union and opposition participation is election-wise a risky strategy for a 
government-led policy (Schludi 2005). In Continental Europe the tension between 
government (irrespective of their political orientation) and labour movement has 
been the primary form of dissent in pension policies (Bonoli 2000). In the Finnish 
context no such controversy has been particularly strong for some time in either 
asset or liability side. Even the historically important issue of promoting public 
pressure for investing TyEL capital in the Finnish real economy has not been on 
labour union agenda in the field governance, albeit some central organisations have 
made this point ‘in their PR agenda’, as one interviewee put it. This said, it must be 
noted that also the employers’ interest in pension capital has dramatically decreased. 
As one interviewee put it, the strong interest in having ‘Finnish flagship owners for 
Finnish flagship companies’ in the 1997 reform preparation was quickly forgotten 
since the opening of financial markets did not lead to foreign investors’ dominance 
in the Finnish markets. The opening up of financial markets in late 1980s caused that 
the domestic enterprises no longer needed pension assets for their investments. The 
last time the topic was on table was the mandate of investment rule reform of 2007 
preparation that included the question of how to increase domestic investments. For 
the actors in the field, the mandate was interpreted so that the issue was discussed 
extensively and then forgotten ‘for good’, as some of our interviewees put it. The 
both parties have agreed in nearly all investment-related issues.
This is not to say employer and employee interests include a static common 
objective in domestic investments. Employers’ major concern in the current context 
is the amount of pension costs that affects the overall labour cost. The employee 
side of the coin is not as straightforward. Currently employees’ contribution to 
pension costs underlines their direct interest in keeping down the total pension 
costs, although their part of the contributions is not variable according to PIC 
investment performance since the mechanism of contribution returns only concerns 
employer contributions. On the other hand, investments in domestic firms could 
directly increase employment, which would serve the interests of the employee 
organisations. The problem here is on the demand side: there have been adequate 
sources for financing the demand in nearly all sectors and in businesses in different 
development phases where TyEL capital could be invested in current legal 
52 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
framework, which makes the positive economic impacts of increasing investment 
of TyEL capital to Finnish financial markets somewhat questionable insofar as the 
investment targets, regulations and methods are not discussed in detail.
Coordination
The nature of coordination in the supposedly first-pillar TyEL field is something 
that a number of pension scholars might find peculiar. The first peculiarity is the 
fact that the TyEL assets are in legal terms owned by the pension providers – not 
the beneficiaries, insurance policyholders, contributors or the state (albeit accounted 
as national wealth) (Kallio 2005). The field coordination is not about deciding 
on how pension savings are used, but only about giving boundary conditions for 
private activities and about forcing private actors (albeit special entities in law) to 
act in accordance with a pension policy with a somewhat fixed repertoire of public 
means. The second peculiarity is that actors coordinating the national system are 
only in part public in legal statute. Indeed, a legally mandated private entity, The 
Finnish Centre for Pensions, coordinates some activities in the field executed by 
other private actors. The third issue is the role of STM in coordinating the scheme: 
although the ministry has a strong legal mandate to coordinate the system, it is in 
many respects impotent to follow its mandate without consent of all actors. The 
division of labour among the coordinating bodies is not altogether clear not least 
due to the overlapping participation of what we call the ‘power law’ situation in 
coordinating and development forums.
The current boundaries for coordination can be described as follows. The 
macro-level coordination of the TyEL scheme is debated in a tripartite committee 
Eläkeneuvotteluryhmä (literally ‘Pensions negotiation group’), led by CEO 
Jukka Rantala of ETK, which was born in the TUPO of 2009. The labour market 
negotiation group provides a high-level forum for the overall development of and 
handling of the disputes within the field. The primary coordination bodies of the 
field, STM and ETK, have a strong mandate that can control various parameters of 
the system with labour market organisations’ support, and they are not likely to be 
able cross their institutional boundaries. Nor can they coordinate assets generated 
by the system, which are left to the decentralised private providers, discussed in 
the next section. Boundary conditions ensuring pension security are drafted by 
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reformation-capable top authority in the field, currently the Rantala group, but the 
control of the implementation is given to government regulatory body FIN-FSA.
Before going to the institutional life of coordination in more detail, a few general 
remarks are needed. Firstly, the traditional institutional life of coordination based 
on ad hoc group formation is very likely changing. The composition of Pensions 
negotiation group is similar to but not the same as previous groups: it is more 
multi-stakeholderist and led by a coordination-related, not implementation-related 
body. Another important development in the field is the adoption of a temporary 
law relaxing the solvency criteria to prevent fire sales of assets during the financial 
crisis of 2007–08. The temporary law is a slight boundary crossing in current 
formation. The ability to implement a new boundary condition in rapid government-
led project has somewhat blurred the traditional order between formation-level 
and coordination-level relational systems in two respects. It has shown that the 
relationship between STM and PICs is more immediate and potential in causing 
changes than the labour market organisation driven order suggests, at least when 
the issues on hand are considered legitimate by the social partners. But it has also 
shown that the central coordination mechanisms in the era of financialised pension 
provision have stepped in the area that was previously considered a non-coordinated 
but decentralised area. Hypothetically, increasing financialisation has increased the 
need for coordination.
Secondly, the tensions between parliamentary politics and labour market 
partners we discussed in the previous section often materialise between STM and 
organs dominated by the labour market partners. In recent years, there has been a 
series of incidents portraying the ‘cat and mouse behaviour’ between politics and 
pension system. In December 2007, STM proposed that pension providers should 
not pay bonuses to their clients during the poor investment returns in financial 
crisis because the government has temporarily eased the solvency criteria in order 
to help insurance providers to overcome the crisis. Despite the plea all the major 
pension insurers paid client bonuses in 2008. Another example is the agreement 
between labour market partners on changes in pension costs in January 2009. The 
premium for employers in the national basic pensions was abolished and the savings 
were used to increase the contributions in the earnings-related pensions. By their 
agreement, labour market partners were able to fix some of the key issues that were 
being formulated in committee on basic security set by STM, which couldn’t have 
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implemented these policies. This was seen as a proof of labour market influence in 
social policy, but it also coincides well with the growing importance of work-related 
pension benefits at the expense of universal basic pension in other EU countries 
(Niemelä & Salminen 2009). 
Self-Regulation with a Public Mandate: The Finnish Centre for 
Pensions and The Finnish Pension Alliance 
It is probably fair to say that The Finnish Centre for Pensions (ETK) has a system-
wide or global coordination role in the Finnish pension regime as a whole, which 
is underlined by the fact that also public pension schemes use its employment 
registry services. In practice, ETK also participates in the preparation of the pension 
legislation. ETK is broadly considered ‘a liaison body’ (Hietaniemi & Ritola 2007), 
a ‘non-authority’ that has government, employer, employee, as well as pension 
insurance company presentation in its governing bodies. The labour market partners 
have a majority in the governing boards of the centre, and pension providers cater 
for the costs of operation.
The purely coordinating role is connected especially to the division of liabilities 
between pension providers. In the Finnish pension regime, the employers choose 
the pension provider(s), or in case of public sector employers use the nominated 
providers. But the PAYG liabilities are based on the accrued pension benefits that 
are calculated for individuals, and in effect, individual employees tend to generate 
liabilities for various providers durgin their work careers. To define the liabilities 
of each provider requires extensive data processing. ETK holds a registry of the 
pensions as well as information of the amount of the pension premiums that are 
used to determine the actual cost for each individual pension provider. From 2007 
onwards, AREK Ltd has registered the earnings data used to award pensions. To 
complement its own register data, the pension provider gets the other data needed 
to calculate the pension from AREK and the Finnish Centre for Pensions.
One constant debate in the field concerns the definition of core functions of ETK. 
For example AREK was separated from ETK because technical data maintenance 
was considered non-core function. Research and communication with international 
bodies are among the core functions, but they have few immediate effects to field 
coordination. ETK also has a controlling role as it decisions on the application of the 
pension acts. Perhaps the most important core task in using coordinative power is 
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related to the bases of calculation of solvency borders and fund transfer obligation, 
the annual liability of pension providers to accumulate funds with contributions, 
which includes besides technical provisions also a supplementary factor dependent 
on average solvency of pension providers and an automatic equity return-linked 
provision (see Hietaniemi & Ritola 2007 for detailed description). ETK is in charge 
of calculation of the obligation, and STM has the opportunity to either accept or 
reject the calculation of the formula. It is however customary that ‘under normal 
circumstances’ ministry does not alter it (Huhtanen 2006). The calculation bases 
are significant as they in part define how much client bonuses PICs can pay and 
how much capital reserves pension providers need to have. 
There has been a tension in the social role of ETK for some time. The tension 
is connected to the relationships between politics and the pension system as a 
whole. The coordinating role among pension providers and the influence of the 
social partners within the governing and financing of the centre highlight the self-
administrative nature of the system. Increased government control over ETK would 
give politicians a much stronger say on the functioning of the pension providers. The 
scholarly discussion of the role of ETK has been mainly legal (Myllymäki 2009; 
see also Huhtanen 2006; Arajärvi 2006), but the divergent conclusions of these 
considerations point to political controversies beyond legal disputes. According to 
one legal scrutiny (Arajärvi 2006), the nature of the duties of the centre have not 
changed or extended to the extent that the role of the centre should be altered on 
practical grounds, but nonetheless so that it is possible should there be a (political) 
will to do so. Another report (Myllymäki 2009) suggested a change in the position 
of the centre arguing that the role of ETK as a non-authority has important public 
authority role in coordinating the decentralised scheme. The suggested solution 
was that ETK would be given an organisational form of public agency under the 
supervision of STM. Moreover, the governing board would consist of civil servant 
and pension experts, but not representatives of the pension providers.
In contrast to the global role of ETK, the industry association Finnish Pension 
Alliance TELA has local roles in coordination. It formally serves as the coordinative 
body of pension provider opinion formation and the representative of common 
interest. TELA is also a central research body in case of investments. But it also has 
a formal local coordination role in preparing the calculation bases. The role is related 
to the composition of pension contributions, in which case TELA is responsible for 
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one essential section in calculation bases. Currently, the section consists of insurance 
mathematicians of all major insurance companies as well as representatives of 
STM and ETK. TELA gets a mandate from insurance companies and then applies 
for confirmation from STM. There are also TELA-led sections for preparation 
of insurance terms and one for preparation of matters related to organisation and 
industry wide pension funds. In this sense, there are also similarities in the role of 
TELA and ETK: they both have dispersed local coordinative functions.
The calculation bases are important as a coordination mechanism because it 
hinders some aspects of the competition between pension providers. The costs 
allocated to the operation of the pension provider and the costs resulting from 
uncollected contributions form a part of the uniform pension contributions for 
all pension providers. This practice makes it difficult for the policyholder (i.e. 
employer) to evaluate the quality and efficiency of the given service. Currently, 
the part that is intended to cover the uncollected premiums has most often been 
enough to cover the losses and collection fees. Therefore pension providers lack the 
incentive for efficient collection of premiums (Rajaniemi 2007). In the conditions 
of fixed product (i.e. TyEL insurance), the coordination of these principles can 
be viewed as cartel type activity that potentially hinders competition among the 
pension providers, or at least shifts focus from price-efficiency to other issues like 
client bonuses (i.e. the contribution returns paid by PICs from investment returns, 
also in part linked to calculation bases) and supplementary services. One TELA 
section and the pension insurance committee of Federation of Finnish Financial 
Services, the Finnish financial sector lobby, have called for more pension provider 
specific calculation bases especially in terms of individualising scheme execution 
costs (Kivisaari 2007).
The coordination stage is the central phase in the pension policy process, and 
TyEL is no exception. In TyEL, however, centrality is not so much connected to 
the importance of the coordination as such, but on the overlapping borders between 
various process stages and among other actors. The preparatory work performed 
in ETK and TELA condition the formation stage in its political spaces, and their 
recommendations and information provision orient the implementation carried out 
by the pension providers. The preparatory work in ETK and TELA can be seen as 
vital parts in coordinating the functioning of the otherwise decentralised pension 
provision. It must be noted that the preparation gives little room for representative 
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democratic decision-making. STM has little say on the components of pension 
contributions. In this way, pension providers indirectly define themselves the most 
important parameters affecting their financial status.
The Coordination Network
Coordination is in many parts based on ad hoc groups set by main coordinative 
bodies, STM, ETK and TELA. It could be even argued that the coordinative power 
of central actors in a significant scope resides in groups that operate between 
different actors in the field, not in bodies as such. The number of these groups is 
impressive. ETK lists annually all the public working groups that have something 
to do with pension reforms, be they macro or most micro level changes. The report 
of 2009 (Kortesoja &  Huikuri 2009) for example lists over 60 working groups and 
coordinating forums set by ministry (STM), industry, and labour market partners, 
that have some relevance concerning parameters of the TyEL scheme or its politics 
(see freely translated groups and the coverage of data in Appendix 1).
The examination on the organisational interlocks between coordination groups 
is described in Figure 1. The data consists of 681 individual members representing 
123 organisations in 56 coordination groups. Organisations with a single link in 
pension coordination were omitted from the graph. The network is based on the 
co-memberships among the organisations. In other words, there is a line between 
organisations if they are represented in the same coordinating group. The thicker the 
line, the more co-representations two organisations have in different coordination 
groups. In this type of analysis, the individuals representing their organisations 
need not be the same, that is, an interlock is established if any two individuals 
from different organisations are members in the same coordination group. The size 
of the points referring to the organisations is scaled to signify the overall number 
of memberships an organisation has in coordination groups. ETK was the top 
organisation with presence in 41 groups. The examination on the memberships 
of various individuals did not reveal an existence of a strong personal ‘pensions 
elite’. Out of 681 individuals 522 were members in only one group, representing 
of 77 per cent of all members. Only 20 persons held 4 or more memberships and 
the highest number of memberships was eight.
The wide composition of partners in the network suggests that the coordination 
network is neither an ‘iron triangle’ (Heclo 1978) in which limited number of 
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actors operate in a relatively closed policy area, nor is it a fluid issue network. 
It seems that coordination of pension policy aims at grasping large number of 
divergent interests into pension policy development. However, the constellation of 
coordination network represents a ’power law’ (Barabasi 2002) in which few actors 
hold a central position and many actors hold a peripheral one. The overall structure 
of the coordination network signifies a core which is divided into two separate yet 
strongly interrelated blocks. The structure of network mimics the division of labour 
between operational pension provision and its supervision. The providers constitute 
one block and all supervisory actors as well as main stakeholders are situated in the 
other. The periphery of the coordination network consists of diffuse combination 
of interests-based and expert organisations. The provider block accommodates 
the PICs, both fund type, service providers of other pension schemes (Church, 
seamen, State, farmers) as well as TyEL support organisations (Silta, Porasto), but 
this block does not have a clear nexus. The other block accommodates multiple 
well connected actors (STM, The Social Insurance Institution of Finland KELA, 
TELA, ETK). Most notably, ETK and TELA occupy central coordinating positions 
between the two blocks. In other words, they are well presented in both blocks of 
pension coordination. It is often the case that central actors marked by multiple 
connections are able to set the pace for the entire network (Provan et al. 2007).
One important feature in the coordination network is the combination of 
representation and expertise. These two “virtues” are not necessarily easy to assemble 
together in the context of pension provision (Clark 2008). Indeed, all stakeholders – 
including labour market organisations, pension providers, STM and other ministries, 
ETK, TELA, KELA, and many other institutions that are considered relevant by the 
actors setting the groups – are represented in using voice and/or receiving knowledge 
from the coordination and discussion groups that are meant to develop policies and 
practices concerning more than one actor in the field. But in a complex field, no 
single actor can define all the relevant issues for debate in all thematic fields, which 
requires expertise, the broad acknowledgement of different system variables and 
perspectives to their actual functioning. These two virtues are combined in group 
composition in a number of working groups that consist of a narrower representative 
group and a very broad expert group, whose demarcation in decision-making is 
clear but less clear in terms of articulating normative perspectives or redefining the 
present discursive frameworks. The distinction between representation and expertise 
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is equally clearly illustrated in the overall coordination network. In addition to the 
main actors in either of the cores many economic expert institutions such as the 
Government Institute for Economic Research VATT, ETLA, Pellervo Economic 
Research PTT are situated in the outskirts of the coordination network. The interests 
of pensioners are present in the coordination, but their position is somewhat peripheral 
in the overall relational structure.
Figure 1. The coordination network of the TyEL regime.
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In theory, there is a great potential for institutional entrepreneurship for those actors 
occupying central positions in organised interactions. We argue, however, that 
effective change with individual-based and more generally actor-based institutional 
entrepreneurship is somewhat limited in TyEL field coordination. One reason is 
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that coordination is strongly conditioned by past measures and strong regulative 
logics. There is number of mechanisms that could be called automatic adjustment 
factors. These adjustment factors are legacies of previous coordination actions 
and they significantly change various parameters in the field. For example, the 
so-called life expectancy coefficient is a mechanism that affects the amount of 
the old-age pension and a method to prepare for increasing longevity. It is applied 
for the first time in 2010 for those born in 1948 and after. In brief, if average life 
expectancy continues to increase, the life expectancy coefficient will reduce the 
monthly pensions. The coefficient of each age cohort is based on calculations made 
by Statistics Finland, drafted by ETK (or ETK-led groups) and accepted by STM 
annually. However pressing urges for institutional changes to this arrangement might 
emerge from within the field, the mechanics of the arrangement could be changed 
only in the tripartite Rantala group. Whilst individual institutional entrepreneurs 
might be able to significantly affect the discursive insights in Rantala group works, 
they are very unlikely able to produce new interpretations of the strong regulative 
institutions in practice by using mechanisms like translation or bricolage. Instead, 
the organised coordination network provides a fertile ground for institutional work 
practiced by all kinds of alliances. 
Implementation
In a decentralised system some of the administrative functions require central 
authority. ETK is a prime actor in taking care of these tasks. It is able to give 
recommendations on implementation to guarantee uniform standards of operation 
among pension providers, makes decisions on what pension scheme an employee 
belongs to in ambiguous cases, and is entitled to take a pension insurance for 
an employer in case it fails to take an insurance for its employees. Otherwise, 
pension provision is functionally much about implementing the pension policy. In 
the institutional life of an organisation field, some of the coordination tasks may 
come very close to implementation, as hinted in the previous section. We are not, 
however, addressing these issues in more detail in this section that is dedicated to 
the relationships of pension providers implementing the pension policy (as insurance 
policies), both mutually and in relation to other actors. As noted, pension providers 
are important in terms of governance primarily because the assets generated by 
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the scheme are not coordinated but decided upon in decentralised manner within 
given boundary conditions.
Pension providers, PICs, company funds and industry-wide funds, that is, have 
a clear fixed role in the field: they manage the insurance policies, collect pension 
contributions, allocate part of the contributions to PAYG liabilities and a part to 
funds, both from which they pay the pension benefits, and make pension decisions. 
The providers are special entities defined by a variety of different laws. The provider 
type and, if a PIC is chosen, the actual provider are selected by the employer. 
The PICs own all their assets, i.e. the contributions and the funds, under normal 
circumstances although their liabilities are defined legally by pension policies 
(Kallio 2005). In defined special circumstances, however, when assets are divided 
among the shareholders and the owner of the guarantee capital, the latter are entitled 
to their investments and reasonable investment returns (see Kallio 2008). The rest 
belongs to the policyholders as part of their stock of insurance, which should be 
used to secure the interests of the insured. The company funds are, albeit nothing 
like German book reserves but closer to Anglo-American pension funds that are 
separated from companies, traditionally protected and guaranteed by the parent 
company. This doesn’t mean that company funds or other provider types would 
generate similar legacy costs, since pensions are universal, predefined and not based 
on job contract, scheme is collectively funded, benefits and liabilities accounted by 
individual employees, and all assets and liabilities are controlled by strict solvency 
and other rules. As one of our interviewees put it, the TyEL scheme is a ‘reach of 
hand’ to the employers, since the pensions arrangements create no competitive 
disadvantages and liability insecurities for individual firms: ‘everything is known in 
advance’. This makes the implementation role of these private providers somewhat 
static, but as it is argued in this section, it is not one without tensions.
Pension Insurance Companies
Pension insurance companies (PICs) are based on the Act on Pension Insurance 
Companies (354/1997) and, in areas it doesn’t cover, on the Insurance Companies 
Act (1062/1979). A PIC handling statutory earnings-related pension insurance 
has to have a concession granted by the Government, which may include special 
conditions meant to safeguard the interests of the policyholders and the insured. 
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A PIC can be founded by one or several natural or legal persons, and at least half 
of the founders have to be resident in the European Economic Area unless STM 
grants an exemption from this rule. The minimum basic capital required for a 
pension insurance company is 5 million euros. Foreign insurance companies may 
not directly engage in Finnish statutory pension insurance, but a foreign corporation 
or natural person may establish a PIC in Finland. The company is subject to the 
same restrictions as regards line of industry and concessions as a pension insurance 
company established by Finns. So far, no foreign insurance company is engaged 
in earnings-related pension insurance business in Finland.
A PIC is bound to pension provision: it cannot handle any other type of 
insurance than The Finnish Pension System insurance under the Employee’s 
Pensions Act (TyEL) and the Self-Employed Person’s Pensions Act (YEL) and 
related reinsurance. All PICs but one (Etera) have strong intrinsic relations or 
directly belong to a broader insurance group, but the statutory earnings-related 
pension insurance has to be kept legally separate from the group’s other insurance 
activities. The assets of the pension insurance company have to be kept separate 
from the assets of companies that belong to the same company group, and the 
annual accounts of the PIC may not be included in the consolidated accounts of 
another company. The financial management and payments traffic of the PIC must 
be arranged so that assets are not used for arranging the financial management or 
payments traffic of another company that belongs to the same company group as 
the pension insurance company.
The administrative structure of PICs follows some ingredients of the ‘traditional’ 
Finnish model of two-tier corporate governance – albeit that currently Finnish 
listed companies dominantly use a one-tier governance model and only few listed 
companies have supervisory boards (Securities Market Association 2008) – i.e. 
it includes not only a Board of Directors (BoD) and general meetings but also 
a Supervisory Board (SB) overseeing the BoD activities. At the annual general 
meetings company shareholders have the voting rights in accordance with the 
Insurance Companies Act. The role of the Supervisory Board (SB), elected at 
the general meetings, is determined by the legislation on limited companies. The 
SB nominates the members of the Board of Directors (BoD), which on its behalf 
elects the managing director following normal practices in limited companies and 
supervises the managing director’s activities.
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PICs are far from other companies when it comes to the composition of these 
bodies the sharing of power in them. Labour market relations in the field are deeply 
embedded in these bodies. The SB and the BoD have to have representatives for 
the insurance policyholders (employers) and the insured (their employees) chosen 
from the candidates suggested by the central labour market organisations. There 
has to be an equal number of such representatives for the employees and for the 
employers, and their total number has to be at least half of the total number of 
members in the SB and BoD, respectively. The pension insurance company must 
have separate committees on elections, appointments, compensations, and audit. 
The election committee consists of persons suggested half by representatives of 
the policyholders and half by representatives of the insured. It makes proposals 
as concerns the remuneration and nomination of the members of the SB to the 
general meeting, and proposals concerning the remuneration and nomination of 
the members of the BoD for the SB.
There are various requirements for individuals in PIC governance. SB and 
BoD members of one company cannot be members of others’. Albeit nominated 
by the social partners, they are not expected represent their interest groups but 
are responsible for their activities fully as individuals. The managing director, the 
CEO, has been given a specific role in PIC governance. The CEO may not function 
as managing director of a credit institution or investment services company in the 
same company group or financial and insurance conglomerate as the insurance 
company. The managing director may also not be a member of the SB or the BoD 
of the company, or the head mathematician of the company, who in collective have 
much cooperation in coordinating calculation bases. 
The type of PIC affects the composition of the adopted governance system. 
According to the law, a PIC can be a joint stock company or a mutual insurance 
company, or a public insurance company mentioned in the Finnish Companies Act. 
There are five mutual PICs and two joint stock PICs (Veritas and Pensions-Alandia, 
the two smallest of seven PICs). This type also affects who will profit (in very limited 
terms) from the insurance activity and more importantly who are the shareholders 
of the company. Hansman (2000) argues that the lack of clear ownership in mutual 
life insurance companies as in many other non-profits results in management 
accumulating excessive capital within the organisation. What applies to US life 
insurance industry does not automatically suit to the Finnish pension insurance 
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industry. The interesting feature in Finnish PICs is that the major companies have 
adopted mutual form primarily after the relaxation of investment regulations 
allowing more investment in stocks and allowing more foreign investments – 
albeit that in strong relation to other organisational changes like the separation of 
Ilmarinen from the Pohjola group and the fusion of Eläke-Sampo and two thirds of 
Eläke-Varma (one third being transformed into Eläke-Fennia) into Varma-Sampo 
(later Varma) in 1998. It could be argued that the ostensibly more prudent of the 
two organisational forms has balanced the riskier investment policies.
The composition of shareholders are written in the Articles of Association of 
each company, which and whose changes have to be confirmed by the FIN-FSA. 
The articles also determine whether the guarantee capital owners are among the 
shareholders of company or not and how many voting rights they may have, 
how the representatives of the insured are selected in case the legal requirements 
(334/2007) of selection are not met, whether the annual general meetings nominate 
the president and vice president of SB or not, whether the SB nominate the president 
and vice president of BoD, how NC is selected, composed and run, and for how 
long period of time the auditors of the company operate. In the limited companies, 
shareholders are simply all who buy company stocks through a book-entry system. 
Buying and selling stocks must be informed to FSA beforehand (for details, see 
1062/1979, 7 §), however. The legislated shareholders of mutual companies are the 
policyholders (TyEL employers and YEL self-employed), the insured (employees 
of TyEL employers) and, if companies choose, the guarantee capital owners and 
the reinsured. All mutual companies have recognised the guarantee capital owners 
and none has recognised the reinsured as shareholders. The mutual companies can 
also choose to define shareholder status so that the insurance policy must have been 
in force, up to three years, in order to be a shareholder.
The voting rights of each mutual company shareholder in annual general 
meetings somewhat varies in mutual PICs (see Table 3). The companies allocate 
votes to the insured firms according to the amount of their pension contributions. 
The law prescribes that all votes per insured firm have to be shared between the 
policyholder and the insured representative so that it reflects the shares of pension 
contributions. This means that policyholders get roughly about three fourths and 
the insured one fourth of the votes However, each insured firm has according to 
the law at minimum two votes, in which case one is allocated to the policyholder 
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and one to the insured representative. This rebalancing mechanism ensures social 
partners’ representation in smaller firms. The law also states that representatives 
may use proxies and this right cannot be constrained, but rather interestingly that no 
representative or proxy can actually vote with more than 10% of total votes present 
in the meeting. Put differently, the centralisation of voting rights is prevented in 
the strictest terms. 
Three mutual companies have a policy that voting rights are directly allocated 
according to the amount of pension contributions.. The minimum number of votes 
for a firm is two, in which case one is given to the policyholder and one to the 
representative of the insured. Two companies have decided to allocate votes so 
that they allocate initial votes, three for a policyholder and one for the insured 
representative one. The guarantee capital owners also get varying number of votes, 
but the share of votes guarantee capital owners have is if not marginal at least minor. 
Varma reports that their guarantee capital owners represent less than 2% of votes 
in annual meetings and Eläke-Tapiola reports this share having always been less 
than 5%. The vast majority of votes are held by TyEL firms. 
The Anglo-American pension governance literature has found many asymmetries 
in the relationship between the division of pension contributions and ability to 
participate in governance relevant to governance prospects (see e.g. Clark 2008). In 
PICs, this division between employers and employees has been rebalanced during the 
last few decades. Until early 1990s when employee contributions were introduced, 
the employers sponsored the whole scheme. Currently employees contribute four 
fifths of the total contributions, although the amount paid is dependent on employee’s 
age (see Hietaniemi & Ritola 2007 for details). Traditionally it has been argued that 
because employers pay the main share of pension contributions, they ought to be 
able to choose and control the provider, but because the success of both parties is at 
stake, they both have an equal share in operative board level governance, which we 
showed indeed is the case in SBs and BoDs. In this vein, the reduction asymmetry 
between contribution shares and participation in governance during the last few 
decades seems consistent. This kind of argumentation misses the point, however, 
because employers can also choose other pension providers that provide different 
avenues for control (see below) – put differently, whatever the balance in formal 
arrangement, it is always dependent on employer choice.
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Table 3. Shareholder voting rights, and Supervisory Board and Board of Directors’ 
composition and eligibility criteria in selected pension insurance companies in 2009.
Varma Ilmarinen Etera Eläke-Fennia
Eläke-
Tapiola Veritas
Shareholder Meetings
Votes per guarantee 
capital share
420 25 (2009) 
12 (2010) 
5 (2011–)
10 100 1
Guarantee capital 
shares
71 13.672 80–320 10 320.000
Minimum number 
of votes per 
policyholder
1* 3 3 1* 1*
Minimum number 
of votes per insured 
representative
1* 1 1 1* 1*
Pension contributions 
(in euros), which 
provides one vote per 
insurance
2000 1700 70
Pension contributions 
(in euros), which 
provides one vote per 
insurance additional 
to the minimum votes
750 2000
Pension contribution 
giving a vote to YEL 
policyholder
2000 3000 2000 1700 70
Supervisory Boards
Members 28 28 28 28 5–40 16–36
Tenure and 
changes**
3 yrs, at 
most 10 
changed 
each year
2 yrs***, 
half 
changed 
annually
2 yrs, 
half 
changed 
annually
3 yrs, at 
most 10 
changed 
each year
3 yrs***, 
one third 
changed 
every year
3 yrs, at 
most 12 
changed 
each year
Max age for nominee – 67 67 – 66 64
Boards of Directors
Members of board 12 12 12 10–12 3–16 4–12
Deputies 3 4**** 4 4 3–8 3–6
Tenure and changes 3 yrs, 4 
members 
changed 
each year
4 yrs 2 yrs 3 yrs, 4 
members 
changed 
each year
3 yrs 1 yr
Max age – – 67 – 66 66
Vice presidents 1– 2 1– 1–***** 1 1
* in case there’s the minimum of votes per one insurance, i.e. two, one is given to employer 
firm and other to the insured – otherwise normal relative sharing applies
** starting from the shareholder meeting in which nominated
*** can be shortened if necessary to manage sufficient change
**** deputy can be personal and nominated for specified member(s) of board
***** if more than one, the insured representative must be nominated as the first vice president.
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Operationally, the SB selects the BoD, confirms their compensation fees, and 
supervises how the BoD and the CEO govern the company. They cannot have 
any other duties according to the law. All companies define the size, member 
eligibility criteria, and member tenure time of SBs (see Table 3). There is some 
variation in requirements, Ilmarinen for example formally requires the members 
to study the pension decisions and investment activities in the company. As it was 
mentioned, a majority or at least a half of BoD members must be chosen from the 
central labour relations organisation candidates, and there must be an equal number 
of employer and employee representatives. Although the board members do not 
represent their background organisations but are by law independent from them, 
there are no substantial obstacles for their mutual coordination, as long as they are 
all concerned with the success of their respective PIC. Otherwise, as long as the 
formal requirements are met, anyone can be a BoD member. In normative terms, the 
only excluded members are government actors, which brings a strong corporatist 
flavour to these arrangements. Labour market BoD candidates are introduced by and 
other candidates nominated by the nominating committee, whose selection methods 
slightly differs between companies.3 The size of BoD has some important differences 
between companies (see Table 3). The BoD operates on majority decision-making 
protocol, but when decisions concern guarantee capital or investment plan issues, 
there must be a two-thirds majority of votes. 
Company Pension Funds and Industry-wide Funds
Company pension funds are based on law on pension funds (eläkesäätiö-
laki, 1777/1995, directly translated as ‘pension foundation law’). A fund can be 
established by an individual EEA-domiciled firm operating in Finland or it can be 
jointly established by a company group, in which case there are some options for 
the method of accounting the liabilities of each employer. The basic requirement for 
establishing a company fund implementing TyEL (type B or type AB executing TyEL 
and supplementary second-pillar pensions) is that it must have at least 300 members 
3 Two companies nominate the president of SB as the president of the NC. The one 
additionally nominates the insured representative as the vice president of the NC and 
selects two other members from employer and two from employee candidates, and the 
other selects two to four members from either SB of BoD. One company selects four 
members from the SB and two from the BoD. Three companies select six members 
either from SB or BoD.
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within two years of the establishment. In this sense, company funds are available 
only for large or growing companies. In analogy to PICs, all company fund assets 
must be kept separate from parent companies. If company funds are large, STM 
can decide whether the fund is run by a one-tier board structure or with two-tier 
SB-board structure.
The governance structure of funds follows the corporate governance models 
of PICs in form albeit not in content. Boards and, in case the fund rules state so, 
SBs are selected with the following framework. A company fund board/SB must 
include at least five members and five deputies. Unless stated otherwise in the 
articles of association, the insured (employees) nominate at least two representative 
members and two deputies, and all other members and deputies are nominated by 
the employer(s). However, when the fund is established, the employer nominates 
the employee representatives as well. If there are more members than five, the 
law requires the employee representation kept in ‘approvable’ ratio to employer 
representation. At least one board member has to be EEA-domiciled unless FIN-
FSA grants an exception. All members are required to have a good reputation 
and sufficient knowledge on the nature and scope of fund activities (or at least 
sufficiently competent advisers), which aren’t however defined in detail. The 
executive management is run by a fund managing director, whose job description 
and relation to the board is in many respects quite similar to fund secretary and 
its relation to trustees in the UK (compare the company pension fund law with 
Ellison 2007).
The law on industry-wide funds (Laki vakuutuskassoista, 1164/1992) states that 
industry-wide funds can be formed by employees of one or more firms or a company 
group, in total more than 300 members are required. As in case of company funds, 
the industry-wide funds must keep their assets separate from other activities, but 
they also need to account assets and liabilities by their sections (by employees of 
different companies). They must pay close attention to their liabilities, and they are 
bound by very extensive albeit slightly different regulations than company funds. 
An industry-wide fund can be established by EEA-domiciled natural persons, 
communities, or foundations, or basically any legal person with STM approval, 
as long as they have sufficient guarantee capital. The fund rules are required to 
be extensive and explicit – the law defines 24 areas that must be included in the 
rules – and approved by STM. 
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If the employees demand and the employers approve, the employees of specified 
firms must belong to the fund. This suggests employers have the veto right over 
whether industry-wide funds can be established to implement TyEL or not, albeit 
a sufficiently large group of employees can establish a fund. The fund must have 
at least three board members and at maximum a corresponding number deputies 
who are both selected by the legally regulated annual meeting, in which employers 
and employees participate with one vote per employee and the employer with the 
number of votes defined by the fund rules. The employers, who are stockholders due 
to paid pension contributions, have the right to nominate half of the board at most, 
the exact right depending on the fund rules. As in company funds, STM can order 
to include a two-tier governance system to the fund rules, in which case SBs have 
at minimum five members and the SB selects the board. As in US pension funds, 
the industry-wide funds have a CEO, whose duties are similar to albeit potentially 
slightly broader than company fund managing director’s. 
To sum up, in industry-wide funds, the employers can basically nominate at most 
half of members of board, whilst in company funds the employers nominate at least 
two thirds of the members. These disparities have been somewhat decreased by new 
regulations implying that in some fundamental issues (not including investment 
policy) decisions require five-sixths’ majority of the votes. The governance of 
pension policy implementation is nevertheless dependent on employer choice, 
since they choose between organisational forms implementing employees’ pension 
policy, and since large companies have the ability to use company funds primarily 
controlled (and risks born by) the employer (see Kallio 2008).
The funds represent dyadic a relationship between a firm and pension provider. 
Apart from the mandatory division of power with the employees in the company 
fund board, a firm does not have to pay attention on the interest aggregation 
with other firms in making investment decisions, but only rely on outside help in 
investment decision-making unless no in-house expertise is available. Employer 
has more say on the investment portfolio than in a PIC, but it also bears more risk 
for poor investment decisions. Industry-wide pension funds, in contrast, comprise 
of members of several firms within the same field of operation. There has to be 
some interest aggregation of the participating firms as well as more risk sharing 
in investment decision-making. The influence on the practical operation of the 
industry-wide fund is not as straightforward as is the case with company-based 
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pension funds due to multiple representational logics within governing boards, 
but on the other hand, pooling of resources makes it easier to control investment 
management internally. Yet, the most common procedure is to get a pension policy 
in one of the pension insurance companies, which puts employer firm in a client’s 
position in relation to a pension provider. The possibilities to control a PIC by any 
single firm are very weak due to great number of the participants, but the client 
position provides access to other privileged financial and insurance services from 
the whole financial group the PIC belongs.
The reduction in the number of funds and organisation wide pension funds has 
been the main trend in the field. The accumulated assets covering pension liabilities 
cannot be transferred from pension insurance company to another in order to 
decrease speculative behaviour among the client firms. Instead, assets are usually 
transferred if employer suspends its pension fund or breaks away form industry-
wide pension fund. The stipulated amount of assets to be transferred has been in 
general quite low so that the expenses of changing the provider to an employer 
would be higher than in case of upholding current contract with one of the PICs. 
However, the accumulated reserve capital in the existing company funds has often 
significantly extended the legal requirements of capital reserves needed in changing 
pension provider. In such instances, liquidating pension fund is financially very 
lucrative. An employer may move its pension policies to insurance company to 
pocket the excess capital accumulated in the company-based pension fund. The 
continuation of liquidation of the funds is likely as companies face uncertainty on 
the future regulations possibly restricting the use of excess capital.
Competition, Collaboration and External Relations
The existence of multiple forms for organising TyEL insurance promotes choice, 
and the relationship between these organisational forms creates some obstacles for 
competition. As we discussed above, the employer selection of the provider type 
is in nature dyadic, all choices illustrating different avenues of power over and 
benefits provided by the organisational type. Not all the organisational forms in 
fact compete with one another: an employer establishes a company fund or allows 
establishing an industry-wide fund if it chooses to, and neither entity competes with 
other types or other similar funds. The funds do not compete directly with PICs 
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either, since the organisational forms are business-bound – employers shut down 
the company fund or secede from the industry-wide fund if they opt for a PIC for 
the same employees. In recent years, the liquidation of company funds has been 
the main form of activity. The pension insurance companies are, however, mutually 
competing for employer choice, which is indeed among the most discussed logic 
in the field. Since the product of the field, insurance policy, is not a means for 
competition, there are only a limit number of domains for PIC competition.
Client bonuses, in which a PIC pays back a part of the collected contributions 
is the most significant tool for mutual competition of PICs. The basic idea behind 
the practice is that better than expected investment returns allow pension providers 
to return some of the premiums to the policyholders (i.e. employers). Typically 
the annually collected premiums extend the cost of pension and the administrative 
efficiency of the pension provider can also decrease costs. Even though the amount 
of the compensation is regulated, well performing companies are able to return more 
of the payment than poorly performing ones. The ability to pay client bonuses is 
dependent on the so-called solvency border that depends on the pension providers’ 
investment allocation. The solvency border is dimensioned so that the probability 
of the pension provider going bankrupt within a year is very low. Regardless of the 
pension provider’s investment allocation, the minimum level of the solvency border 
is 5 per cent of technical provisions. The rules on solvency margin are common 
for all pension providers but the so-called operating zones related to the solvency 
border differ according to type of pension provider. In the normal zone of operations, 
the distribution of client bonuses is based on the regular formulae. In case of PICs, 
the normal zone holds when the solvency margin is more than the solvency border 
but under four times the solvency border. Permanent exceeding of the maximum 
amount of the solvency margin is not permitted. If the solvency margin exceeds 
the maximum amount for a second year in a row, the company has to increase its 
client bonus transfers by one-third of the sum exceeding the maximum amount. 
When the solvency margin falls below the solvency border, a company cannot pay 
client bonuses. If the solvency margin is less than two-thirds of the solvency border 
the company has to file a plan to improve its financial position and if the solvency 
margin falls below one-third the company has to file a short-term financing plan 
with the FIN-FSA.
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The interviewees in PICs tended to consider competition between the companies 
'fierce', but client bonuses only one mechanism among others in competition. Other 
very commensurable means were the ability to offer supplementary and other 
services according to client needs. As the means for competition are limited, it 
was also regarded as a matter of PR and even window-dressing. PICs must try to 
look good in all aspects, which may incur in some more sinister areas than mere 
looks. There is for example a strong belief in PICs that other companies adjust their 
allocations and other portfolio characteristics right before field-wide gathering data 
for reporting in order to look better in the eyes of potential clients. Some interviewees 
and informants called this kind of competition waste of pension savings. Independent 
on the question of  should we have as sinister a view on competition than the field-
insiders or not, the importance of competition is highlighted by various institutions.
For example, competition is important because client-provider-relationships 
are very much loyalty-prized. All the PICs have for some time had typical sector 
or industry related customer blocks – Varma for example has been a primary PIC 
for the largest Finnish companies, Eläke-Fennia for small entrepreneurs, and 
Etera, the former LEL fund, for the seasonally and short-term employed like the 
building sector and artists. More generally speaking, the PICs used to be tightly 
connected to financial blocks build around major banks and insurance companies, 
which reflected linguistic divisions, agrarian interests, and social democratic 
interests (Heiskanen & Johanson 1985). The opening up of financial markets in 
the late 1980s together with the recession of 1990s somewhat disentangled these 
blocks. Social democratic capital base withered and, most importantly, its main 
PIC went bankrupt. The linguistic capital bases merged together and later became 
part of the Scandinavian financial block, whereas agrarian interest block survived 
to some extent. The EU accession in 1995 and the new governance rules of 1997 
further separated PICs from these blocks, but did not cut down their operative 
ties altogether. The EU exemption to IORP directive stated that pension insurance 
should be kept separate from other insurance activities, and PIC assets should be 
kept separate from the conglomerate financing in general. Nevertheless, all except 
one of the current PICs are parts of a larger financial group consisting of bank and 
other insurance and investment activities either as subsidiaries or as active external 
partners. In practice, conglomerates are able to package their pension insurance 
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policies together with other financial services such as insurance against lost or 
damage, which also causes some tensions in PIC competition.
This kind of competition aside, the regulatory framework sets the pension 
providers in a difficult mutual relationship also in other areas, especially in case 
of investments. Firstly, the solvency rules set the mutual relationship that can be 
called, as two interviewees put it, ‘game theoretical’. Since the amount of capital 
reserves of PICs is dependent on the solvency of other companies, it is impossible 
for a PIC to formulate long-term solvency strategies in investment portfolios (not 
to be confused with long-term investment strategies that are according to nearly 
all investment-related interviewees next to impossible in the TyEL field due to 
short-term solvency requirements). All the PICs must include others’ actions into 
considerations here, which significantly curbs the possibilities for radically different 
investment strategies especially in terms of allocations, which is one of the key 
contemporary justifications for investment decentralisation. Secondly, and partly 
additionally, ‘the system carries the risk’ (as various interviewees put it) only in 
terms of equity returns. This suggests that equity investment plays a separate role 
from all other investments in the field, although there are essential differences in 
investments to other asset classes as well. This again implies that PICs must take 
other companies’ equity strategies into consideration in specific when creating their 
allocation strategies. Various interviewees said this problem could be addressed by 
changing the nature of solvency rules or by shifting more risk from the PICs to the 
system, typically by increasing the significance of the equity performance linked 
component in funding transfer obligation either by changing the percentages or by 
addressing other asset classes.
These two issues are enough to create elastic tensions in the field. But solvency 
rules became more problematic than before in the financial crisis of 2008, when 
the government, with the blessing of labour market parties, applied a temporary 
two-year exception law that changed the solvency rules. The government bill 
(HE 180/2008) was supposed to prevent fire sales of shares – especially Finnish 
ones, as it is stated in the bill, bringing a nationalist flavour to the decision albeit 
that most of the assets that would have been sold were not Finnish – in conditions 
of diving bear markets. The bill introduced various changes. It directly raised the 
stock return buffer to 10 % in contrast to original gradual change model. The fund 
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liabilities were increased only by the nominal 3% rate independent of solvency ratios 
or investment performance. Effectively, due to negative stock returns, this meant 
that money was transferred from the funds to pension provider capital reserves. If 
these measures were not taken, the pro-cyclical nature of solvency rules was feared 
to have had disastrous effects to TyEL investments. At the same time, however, 
the bill made it possible for PICs to include the so-called EMU-buffer temporarily 
in the solvency margin. The buffer refers to tasausvastuu, the short-term buffer 
that hedges against changes in pension contributions and is included in the PAYG 
component, not the funded part. When Finland joined the European Monetary Union, 
the buffer was set high. Joining the union was expected to raise the short and middle 
term volatility in the total wage sum and, consequently, the pension contribution 
rates, which was hedged against with the buffer. The temporary law, which was 
in late 2009 continued by two more years until the end of 2012 (Rantanen 2009), 
set an important new variable to the “game” presented above. Now, PICs need not 
only to “guess” the allocations of other PICs but also whether they are planning 
their portfolios based on inclusion or exclusion of the buffer. The choice is crucial 
for defining success in the market development, but it is others’ choices and new 
rules that will ultimately determine how beneficial the choice was. This problem 
is currently being debated in the Rantala group.
There are some other institutional forms besides the equity-linked fund transfer 
obligations that set the pension providers to a mutual relationship with very different 
logics than competition. The most important feature decreasing competition is 
the joint responsibility of liabilities among pension insurers. The leading aim of 
this practice is to ensure the security of pensions at all times. It is possible for the 
insurers to go bankrupt, but it is not in the interest of other providers to let any of 
the rivalries do that, as the joint responsible requires other companies to take care 
all of the liabilities and possibly only part of the assets of the terminated company. 
Joint responsible is ex post facto collaborative arrangement. It does not require 
coordination arrangements among the pension insurers, but it most certainly 
diminishes the strength of competition between them. Moreover, it makes all actors 
‘too big to fail’, albeit anything but equally too big. 
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To conclude, it can be argued that the current investment-related rules and 
competition schema set the pension providers to an antagonistic mutual relationship, 
which cannot be reduced only to competition or collaboration but rather to other 
problematic mutual institutional dependencies. However, it also seems that the 
current institutional life sets the pension providers to an antagonistic relationship 
also towards the field outsiders. One interviewee stated that there is ‘no way 
whatsoever’ a field outsider, or even all insiders like most employers, can evaluate 
on basis of official information whether a PIC has performed well in its investments 
or not. Indeed, the short-term solvency and reporting requirements create a situation 
in which neither investment successes nor failures are too transparent. This not 
only makes competition difficult but also generates much room for normative 
contestation and alternative justifications for activities. As one interviewee put 
it, the PICs are situated in environment of ‘volatile opinions’. Some interviewees 
also considered the ‘official expectations’ (embedded in e.g. the future projection 
calculations) of four percent real long-term investment returns very difficult to 
achieve in investments, which hardly makes these issues any less significant. 
Institutional Work and Entrepreneurship in Implementation
The multiple logics of administration give in theory much room for institutional 
entrepreneurship and institutional work. But institutional work in this stage of 
the policy process is not very likely at least in terms of changing actors’ mutual 
relationships. This is not only due to the fixed pension product. The pension 
providers are already included in multi-stakeholder coordination, and they have 
little to achieve by acting in concert outside already institutionalised bodies. They 
are also controlled internally by the stakeholders and externally by the regulators 
so that clear alliances between PIC against others serve few purposes. For example, 
the mid-size PICs have little to gain attacking the large companies, because there 
are few if any domains in which they could form a common interest. In case of 
investments for instance Eläke-Tapiola is a conservative investor (e.g. with no 
hedge fund investments) whilst Eläke-Fennia is a more innovative investor with 
very active asset management and bets in alternative asset classes. As for another 
example, Etera is the only PIC with no financial group support, whilst Eläke-
Tapiola and Eläke-Fennia are parts of large mutually competing groups, Fennia 
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an insurance group and Tapiola a financial conglomerate with insurance, mutual 
fund and bank services. 
It must be noted here that the mutual normative relationships between PICs are in 
part antagonistic also in quite symbolic terms with long historical normative roots. The 
dominant large companies, Varma and Ilmarinen, have had a special role in the field, 
Ilmarinen for example as essential system developer (e.g. calculations of the effects 
of solvency rules reform of 1997) and Varma as the initiator of Finnish shareholder 
activism, and they continue to use their economies of scale especially in investment 
organisation. Ilmarinen, for example, has a dedicated allocation team whilst other 
companies more or less have intra-organisational strategic debates on these issues, 
which also internalises various alternative investment techniques more common to 
entities like hedge funds rather than most PICs. Traditionally, the two companies 
have been more involved than others in the reformation processes, and they still have 
strong opinions on how to develop the field. According to our interviews, there is 
still very much scepticism towards their power to affect the reformation of the field 
despite the more inclusive composition of the new Rantala group.
However, in terms of setting the boundaries for the field in respect to the 
broader society, there have been some quite successful measures of institutional 
work where all pension providers have been able to cooperate. TELA has played 
a major role here. The pension providers have for example drafted together the 
TELA recommendations for responsible investments (TELA 2008) and ownership 
policies (TELA 2006), which both have been adopted by PICs, albeit internalised 
in actions in likely different scopes. The responsible investment (RI) guidelines, 
originally drafted in 2006 and reformed in the beginning of 2008, are important in 
boundary setting in various terms. They seek legitimacy for the field activities from 
macro-level institutional frameworks (e.g. PRI and UN Global Compact) that go 
beyond immediate shareholders and stakeholders, define avenues through which 
responsibility of investment practices might be evaluated and how it should be 
interpreted inside the field, and even introduce some direct normative boundaries. 
The guidelines highlight the importance of (regulative) pension system and Finnish 
parliament’s emphasis on RI issues during the 2006 reforms in determining pension 
funds’ responsibilities. The guidelines enforce a certain hierarchy for external 
responsibilities. The hierarchy is set by legislation demanding for profitability and 
security, and it ought to be enforced in RI: ‘investors of pension assets must place 
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the primary focus on expected returns and security in all investment decisions’, 
andthe ‘costs of responsible investment must be reasonable in relation to other 
investment costs incurred by the pension insurer’. The one clear normative boundary 
for investments is that ‘[p]ension assets must not be investment in illegal activities, 
or activities that are either directly or indirectly in conflict with international 
agreements on human rights and basic freedoms’.
Institutional entrepreneurship of individual providers has also been a potent 
force in case of investments. After riskier and more profitable investments were 
sought to be enabled in 1997 and later in 2007 reform, PICs became crowded by 
financial professionals replacing old social insurance personnel, which was brought 
up by many interviewees. Their organisational paradigms changed drastically, and 
so did investment practices. This set the whole field, or at least its ‘asset side’, to a 
new relationship to other fields, most importantly the so-called ‘domain of finance’ 
(Langley 2008a). Whilst financialisation requires great focus and sometimes 
centralisation in governance and management (see e.g. Clark & Thrift 2004), it 
also potentially cause changes to old roles within fields connected to these changes. 
Currently, for example, two PICs have had internationally exceptionally large stakes 
in hedge funds that have performed financially quite well despite the financial crisis 
and, according to some interviewees, in general fit the PIC investment portfolios 
very well despite attacks by many public figures, whose antagonistic opinions are 
by many field-insiders considered ‘an intellectual bankruptcy’. The hedge fund 
investments have been also legitimately classified less risky than the legal default 
framework suggests (the PICs are required prudentially to classify assets according 
to their real risks instead of legal categories if the risks differ), which suggests 
that the innovative use of regulations has provided more room for differences in 
investment portfolios than in previous years, which may in the future change at 
least the investor-identities of PICs.
Control
In principle, the preparation and implementation of laws define the overall 
composition of the TyEL policy scheme (Louekoski 2005). In practice, however, as 
we have shown, the formation of the laws, and the coordination and operations of 
the field are in great respects in private hands, both in individual (pension providers) 
78 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
and collective (coordinative groups and bodies) organisational arrangements. 
However, the functioning of the field is strongly supervised and controlled by public 
agencies. STM and its Department of Insurance are the main actors of government 
supervision over the TyEL scheme. The ministry for instance gives concessions 
for operation for new pension providers, confirms their articles and rules, and 
in general hold the highest interpretative power to define how actors are fit-for-
purpose to operate especially a priori. Operative control, which is the topic of this 
section, belongs to the competence of Finanssivalvonta, The Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FIN-FSA). Furthermore, pension providers have their own internal 
control systems required by the FIN-FSA guidelines.  In addition to these actors, 
Finnish Competition Authority (CA) has been active in pointing out deficiencies 
in the competition among pension providers. The competition authority is not a 
specific part of the control regime of the TyEL system but holds a general national 
mandate in promoting competition and supervision of competition law.
The Financial Supervisory Authority 
As it has been the case with numerous other countries, the Finnish financial sector 
has been in recent years characterised by the agglomeration of financial services. 
‘Financial warehouses’ provide insurance, banking as well as investment advisory 
or management services. The changes in the control over the financial sector in 
Finland have mimicked the development in financial services. The newly established 
FIN-FSA oversees banking, insurance – including TyEL pension provision – and 
investment services. The authority was born when the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority (Vakuutusvalvontavirasto) and the old Financial Supervision Authority 
(Rahoitustarkastus) merged in 2009. Our interviewees welcomed this development 
warmly especially since the old insurance authority was considered to lack expertise 
on investment issues that the FIN-FSA is considered to have. FIN-FSA is formally 
organised under the Bank of Finland, but in practice it is assumed to have an 
independent control mandate over the financial sector, including TyEL providers. 
The IMF noted in 2001 that government representation in the Finnish supervisory 
authorities regulating insurance companies might lead to lack of clarity in the 
supervisory tasks in times of crisis in particular. Yet, the BoD of the new FIN-
FSA consists of five members one of which is appointed by STM and one by the 
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Ministry of Finance (VM). Whilst the government has been in many terms excluded 
from formation and implementation processes, and given a more technical role in 
coordination, it is strongly present in the controlling bodies.
The governance of FIN-FSA, including for instance competency requirements 
and mutual relationship of governing bodies (Bank of Finland Bank Council, 
the BoD, the executive director etc.), are regulated in detail by law (878/2008). 
FIN-FSA has a broad mandate in controlling pension providers. In most general 
level, it supervises all the activities of providers and participates in regulatory 
development. It has a strong legal right to request and receive information from 
pension providers. It can also sanction non-compliance with different kinds of fines 
and public notices, withhold the management operations, and even temporary and 
permanent cancellations of operational permits. FIN-FSA has a right and a duty to 
budget its operations, which it covers with legislated payments by the supervised 
and other authorities (and taxpayers). The Bank of Finland compensates in case 
FIN-FSA activities cause illegitimate direct economic harm to the supervised or 
other actors.
The FIN-FSA guidelines concerning pension provider activities give the most 
accurate picture on its role in the field. The guidelines are quite extensive in 
content, and thus cannot be discussed here in detail. Take for instance the most 
general (ca. 200 pages) regulatory guidelines for insurance companies, which 
also include specific instructions for PICs. The guidelines concern six different 
domains: general principles, governance and financial statements (including 
e.g. competence requirements, internal supervision, risk management, auditing, 
accounting, and annual report disclosure), technical provisions and solvency (with 
dedicated chapter to PICs), financing, supervision, and special regulations. The 
FIN-FSA and its predecessors have conducted close inspections to governance 
structures of PICs in recent years. As some of our interviewees pointed out, there 
haven’t been any major concerns or substantive hints for any non-compliance in 
any PIC. The regulator has been nevertheless concerned especially with longer term 
changes in investment management, for example with the new decision-making 
models in which investment managers are given broader mandates than in previous 
arrangements in which more investment decisions were made by hierarchically 
higher-level bodies like investment committees.
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Internal Supervision and Self-Control
Part of the control function is internal to pension providers, which is especially 
strong in case of PICs. Companies are required to organise internal monitoring 
and control in addition to organising audit. Self-control is enhanced by more 
detailed legal requirements. There are for example competence criteria for the 
top management, internal reporting system independent of the reported actions, 
as well as internal monitoring of the outsourced actions. The BoDs have a special 
role in internal supervision and control. The BoDs are held responsible for ensuring 
that investment activities, risk management and internal inspections are suitably 
organised. Boards are expected to understand risk and restrict the company of taking 
excessive risks. They are expected to oversee CEO and management of the company. 
The FIN-FSA has stated that all major PICs should have internal inspection function 
including dedicated personnel to perform it. The adoption of corporate governance 
principles has required the establishment of election, nomination and inspection 
committees within boards. Moreover, CEO can no longer be a member in either 
board or supervisory board.
In case of investments, the ‘external’ control mechanisms like coordinated 
solvency rules and fixed rules preventing centralisation of investment risks 
have been complemented by regulations enhancing prudential self-control. For 
example, before 2007, all investments had to be classified according to legally 
defined categories, which were used not only to report investment activities but 
also to calculate solvency borders and reserve capital requirements. From 2007 
onwards, the pension providers have been required to prudentially classify the 
investments, in case they differ from the legal classifications (that were also 
redefined and extended in 2007, see 1114/2006 for detailed rules), according actual 
risk properties, not their legal types. The supervisory challenge behind this change 
was the increase in the new types of investment vehicles like hedge funds, which 
are often difficult to categorise according to their risk level because of either their 
lack of transparency or simply rapid changes in risk profiles, investment methods 
and other basic characteristics. The classifications are important frameworks for 
investments at least two respects: they serve as the primary avenue of embedding 
investment risks to prefunding mechanisms, to asset-liability-mismatch and to 
insolvency risk management, and they create a discursive template for investment 
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making. The direct legal restrictions for investments (see 1114/2006 and FIN-FSA 
guidelines) are also based on the legal classifications, which in part amplify the 
prudential responsibility to assess actual risks.
There is a variety of types in self-control regarding PIC operations, which is 
illustrated well by the differences compliance and controller functions. Although 
compliance has been a central issue for TyEL providers for decades, the dedicated 
organisational compliance functions are quite recent. For example, Eläke-Fennia 
(according to its Annual Report 2004) started the preparation of this function in 2004. 
Compliance functions are usually integrated to investment organisations rather than 
dedicated divisions. They are meant to ensure that all investment activities comply 
with external and internal rules and standards in qualitative terms. Although the 
functions are typically implemented by lawyers, the compliance is not restricted to 
immediate legal regulations concerning pension provision. It can mean, for example, 
ensuring that investments comply with the UNPRI-required ESG policies or that 
Finnish investee firms have accepted the Finnish Corporate Governance standards. 
The controller functions, in contrast, are based on quantitative control based on risk 
assessments (e.g. Value-at-Risk, scenarios) and more general economic development 
supervision. Especially the largest PICs have quite extensive controller divisions.
The Competition Authority
The Competition Authority (CA, Kilpailuvirasto) has been active in trying to control 
the TyEL field. Its objective is to protect sound and effective economic competition 
and to increase economic efficiency. The tension between the pension providers and 
CA originates from the dual role of pension providers in implementing both legally 
imposed objectives of the social policy and the business activity of the PICs. CA 
has pointed out that PICs are private corporations aiming at generating profits and 
therefore subject to competition law. The primary controversy arises from the level 
of cooperation between competing pension providers. The PICs have been given 
the special legal status of pension providers, the actors of a statutory pension field, 
which should allow them more cooperation than in standard competitive market 
arrangements. Nevertheless, CA has raised issues on cooperation (albeit very 
limited) in defining principles for premium lending (in 1997), the cooperation in 
defining the fees paid to investment brokers (2000), cooperation in the principles 
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of calculation (2009), and it has made an initiative to increase competition among 
the pension providers (2005).4
The initiative to increase competition in particular had an influence to the field as 
one of the development projects issued by STM (Rajaniemi 2007) was related mainly 
to the deficiencies of competition raised by CA and finding possibilities to increase 
it. The line between business activity in competitive markets and cooperation within 
statutory-based pension provision is indeed difficult to define – and even more so 
to control. The history of Finnish pension provision has emphasised cooperative 
practices but both the decisions given by the CA and all the responses given by 
TELA indicate that the line between the allowed cooperation and hindering of the 
competition is far from clear and controlled. In part, this has much to do with the 
general development of the field. The mix of cooperation and competition was not 
considered a problem initially in a closed financial community. The sensitivity to 
issues hindering competition is much more recent a development in the control 
stages of the policy process. In this sense, the discussion of the border between 
cooperation and competition highlights the demarcation line between the “old” 
and the “new” pension field.
4 See http://www kilpailuvirasto.fi.
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6 TyEL Field as a Public-Private Partnership 
 and Implications for Further Research
One of the main purposes of this study has been to study how the two mixed logics 
of administration, public administration and corporate governance, are in play and 
operate in a field of pension provision combining public and private elements. If 
anything, the case of Finnish TyEL field has shown that a PPP in pension provision 
can mix these ideal type elements in a very complex way. The first noteworthy 
issue here is that there are some characteristics from both logics in play. The field 
represents public administration exclusively only in one respect: the usage and 
funding of the earnings-related pension scheme is mandatory – no private sector 
employer or employee in Finland can evade it. It represents corporate governance 
in three respects. Firstly, it is financed with fees and charges, not by independent 
budgeting. Secondly, the goals and performance expectations of the field are very 
clear: the stable and legally controlled provision of fixed pension insurances, and 
the secure and profitable investments of the generated assets. Thirdly, the scheme 
is owned by its shareholders, not by citizens or their representatives. Yet none of 
these four ideal type features quite match the ideal types in practice: the fees are 
legally mandatory, the competition is based on fixed product, and the composition 
of shareholders is legally defined highly corporatist and stakeholderist. Indeed, 
despite being in formation a mandatory system based on law and controlled by 
public bodies, employers and employees in collective own the private pension 
providers that own all the assets, and coordinate the field through organisations 
situated in a specific network.
The second noteworthy issue is that there are two areas in which both ideal 
types seem to be equally (ir)relevant. The nature of formal governance (‘what is 
to be governed’) in Finnish pension provision seems to make the division of even 
the ideal type logics difficult. The societal impact of the TyEL field is definitely 
broad and considerable: it provides earnings-related old age and other pensions 
for over a fifth of all Finns. On the other hand, this broad impact is currently more 
present in the persistently important ‘liability side’ of the field, whilst the importance 
and impacts of the ‘asset side’ of the entire field is highly variable according to 
provider size, and has in total continued to diminish during the last two decades as 
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the nature of TyEL as national project more generally has diminished. Although 
pension providers continue to play an essential role in Finnish financial markets, it is 
more due to institutional complementarities and recognition of importance by other 
actors than a coordinated effort or characteristic goal of TyEL capital. Moreover, 
individual acts by decentralised coordinative bodies or pension providers hardly 
produce large societal impacts, which is more a field-level property. 
Another such issue challenging theoretical relevance of ideal types is political 
influence towards the field. Indeed, as in corporate governance, political influence 
attempts are primarily handled as expectations towards somewhat independent 
actors, which is in great part true for all actors and in various discourses in the field. 
But in stark contrast to corporate governance, these are hardly exceptional, as all 
the actors in the field constantly face broad societal expectations in their activities. 
The buffering of influence attempts typical to public administration is thus equally 
relevant here. However, buffering is politically selective in elastic manner, which is 
hardly an ideal type feature of public administration (albeit nothing extraordinary 
in practice). Although central government control is constantly eliminated, some 
political parties have strong links with the central labour market organisations that 
are present in all relevant bodies in the field but the FIN-FSA.
What is most typical for the TyEL field in respect to these two logics is that 
its logic of governance at the same time mixes elements from both logics and 
includes elements that fit neither of these ideal types. This is most visible in case 
of markets, especially when the product and its producer are analytically separated. 
The product of the field is politically fixed and overseen, which is typical to public 
administration of first pillar schemes. The producer of this product, in contrast, 
can be selected, either from existing corporate pension providers (PICs) or by 
creating a new one, either employer (company fund) or employee (industry-wide 
fund) driven, alone or in collaboration. This is more typical to purchase behaviour 
related to corporate governance although very particular in form. But neither of 
these aspects quite captures the agency issues: it is not the insured whose purchase 
behaviour or democratic public bodies whose oversight we are looking at, so the 
agency issues related to TyEL are ‘dislocated’ in both perspectives.
The mutual relationship of key actors is another such area. All actors that are 
participating in the production of the insurance collaborate with each other in 
one way or another. Yet one group of pension providers, the dominant PICs, also 
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compete between each other. Competition can be fairly called the most problematic 
of the mixed features, since it on one hand is consistent with the paradigm of 
decentralisation of both ownership and coordination, but on the other makes the 
field vulnerable to otherwise less relevant fields (EU regulations, competition laws 
etc.) and causes difficult tensions within the field. The very restricted nature of both 
competition and collaboration begs the question of how well either of the two ideal 
type governance logics actually characterise the relationship between the key TyEL 
actors that have variable functions.
Table 4. Public administration, corporate governance and the TyEL field.
Public 
administration
TyEL Corporate 
governance
Markets Oversight bodies 
behave as markets
Selection of 
supervised 
producers
Purchasing 
behaviour defines 
markets
Mutual 
relationships 
of key actors
Collaboration among 
organisations 
offering a given 
service
Limited competition 
and collaboration 
between service 
providers; networked 
collaboration of other 
key actors
Competition among 
organisations 
offering a given 
service
Source of 
finance
Financing by 
budgets
Financing by fees 
and charges
Financing by fees 
and charges
Political 
influence
Buffering to deal with 
influence attempts
Selective buffering of 
influence attempts, 
broad and elastic 
expectations
Political influence 
handled as 
exceptions
Coerciveness Mandatory funding 
and use
Mandatory funding 
and use
Voluntary 
consumption and 
payment on use
Scope of 
impact
Broad, considerable 
societal impact
Broad total societal 
impact, variable 
individual actor 
impact
Narrow, little societal 
impact
Ownership Citizens Defined stockholders Stockholders
Goals and 
performance 
expectations
Ambiguous and 
changing
Clear but changing Clear and stable
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In conclusion, it seems that the TyEL field includes a peculiar institutional 
relational system that can be characterised by the ideal type division between public 
administration and corporate governance only in very limited sense at best (see Table 
4 for overview). Instead, we can capture a variety of relevant governance logics and 
characteristics with a more detailed theory-driven field level analytical description. 
This enquiry has revealed a number of issues typical to TyEL governance that 
cannot be predicted by the public-private-division, including the different logics 
of governance in the ‘asset side’ and the ‘liability side’, the difference between 
the product and the providers, the peculiar agency issues like the asymmetry 
between sponsoring and client bonuses, the seemingly paradoxical duality of 
systemic centralisation and decentralised coordination and implementation, and 
the antagonistic mutual relationships of key actors. 
Yet the combination of public and private ideal type elements is by and large 
central in all the elastic key relational tensions. In our case analysis, we have found 
at least three relevant and characteristic institutional tensions in the relational 
arrangement of TyEL field. These issues are not static institutions but locations 
of clashes between institutional forms whose usage in practice on one hand may 
produce difficult tensions and undercut proficiency, but may on the other also 
create very dynamic properties in Finnish pension provision. As the uses of some 
institutional forms include clashing efforts to both maintain some forms and change 
others, the questions of institutional entrepreneurship by individual actors and of 
institutional work by different kinds of alliances become essential. 
The first one is the general political tension between formal regulative rules and 
normative-discursive practices. This is best characterised by the disparity of de jure 
hegemony of public bodies – parliamentary decision-making, the highest regulative 
power of STM, and the strong control mandate of government-led FIN-FSA over 
pension providers – that especially in case of STM turns to de facto impotence to 
use their power over private actors without labour market acceptance and initiative, 
and field-wide practitioner-led private preparation. The important issue here is that 
impotence is not just “written” in the system in informal terms but also constantly 
maintained – also by public bodies themselves. For example, during the financial 
crisis of 2007–08 the government could have indirectly taken pension providers 
under increased public control via FIN-FSA simply without loosening the solvency 
rules, but they didn’t. This suggests that there are stronger virtues than public 
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control in general, for example financial performance of pension providers or the 
development of Finnish capital markets. As we have discussed, the parity-principled 
labour market driven governance includes selective party political representation, 
lock-in situations, and all but obvious political gains arising from efforts to increase 
public control over privately managed governance schema.
The disparity has nevertheless many political consequences, which needs to be 
theoretically recognised in further studies on European pension governance. The 
political and normative contestation of the functioning of the scheme is typically 
directed to politicians (witness the public fury towards social democrats when the 
indexing rules were changed in 1996) and pension providers (witness the public 
contestation of hedge fund investments in 2008–09), although the insiders that have 
been given the effective capability to introduce changes in the field are neither of 
these actors but the labour market parties, including for example issues like the 
automatic adjustment mechanisms based on their past decisions and decentralised 
expert coordination. The diminishing political interests of social partners towards 
the operational aspects of the system and the diminishing employer and employee 
participation to the central organisations may create a political vacuum in 
accountability of TyEL governance, be it conceptualised in public or private terms. 
This in paradox makes political consequences of institutional changes difficult to 
predict but also leaves more room even for attempts to field-level coups.
The second one is the tension between decentralised governance and centralised 
presence. The TyEL field is perhaps best characterised as decentralised centralisation. 
The TyEL field is not centrally coordinated by any pejorative private ‘pensions 
mafia’, and it needs to be confirmed in future research whether even a ‘pensions 
elite’, a powerful network of individuals, is able to influence field coordination with 
entrepreneurial efforts in decentralised coordination. In our analysis, the essential 
aspect in this characterisation is the combination of the public administration type 
omnipresence of private social partners – both in individual representation (e.g. 
employer and employee representatives in mutual PIC annual meetings) and in 
collective representation through central labour market organisation nominations 
(e.g. in PIC BoDs) and direct representatives (e.g. ETK board, ad hoc groups) – and 
the seemingly decentralised private coordination network. Although any ad hoc 
body or pension provider can hardly produce significant field-level institutional 
change via institutional entrepreneurship, the combination of decentralisation and 
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centralised omnipresence causes a strong possibility for institutional work attempts. 
This potential is essential in the tensions between public and private control. Most 
importantly, the strong presence of the private ‘non-authority’, ETK, in almost 
all bodies handling pension benefits and costs (but not assets left outside funding 
transfers) gives an incentive to bring the coordination network under public 
supervision or even control without large efforts since it is in regulative terms 
simply very easy to do, not least on constitutional grounds.
The benefit of this kind of ‘decentralised but centralised’ governance in a mature 
field such as Finnish TyEL scheme is that it provides dynamism for change and 
adaptation despite possible tensions and inconsistencies. The demands for expertise 
in a complex area of governance usually facilitate planning but at the same time 
create structural rigidities. In other words, a technocratic ethos cannot explain the 
seemingly successful changes within pension governance. Here, the consensual 
and centralised bargaining culture probably plays a role, but it is the decentralised 
field coordination that is able to offer multiple negotiation forums both formal and 
informal in which divergent interests and controversies can be handled somewhat 
effectively. Furthermore, the relatively weakly institutionalised overall composition 
level ‘meta-governance’ provides much room for mutual adjustment procedures 
among the actors as well as allows changes in the positions of individual actors. 
These findings have theoretical significance in the discussions on the emergent 
and mature institutional fields in institutional theory as well as on the discussion of 
parametric and systemic changes within the examination of pension policies. Based 
on our examination of a mature field of Finnish pension field, the diffuse power 
structure and formally ambiguous roles for the actors might be more important 
in maintaining dynamism for change than the age of the field would suggest. In 
other words, the field may well retain its emergent properties if the constituting 
rules encourage actors to constitute and reconstitute their positions in perpetuity.
The third tension is the incompatibility of change in institutional goals in the 
field level and in the level of individual pension providers. In the liability side, the 
publicly set goal of the field functioning has been despite parametric institutional 
changes quite static, to provide primary pension security for private-sector workers 
in Finland, whilst in the asset side the function has changed much over time. The 
initial function, the provision of pension capital to Finnish national economy, was a 
bricolage combining the previous goals of the national funds to existing insurance 
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company and fund based architecture. In the early days of TEL, investments were 
supposed to enhance national real economic competitivity, in 1970s the closely 
investment related client bonuses were thought in terms of counter-cyclic economic 
policy, and in 1990s the funds were subjected to the mission of saving Finland from 
the recession. Since the late 1990s, the goal of investments has simply been the 
permanent long-term lowering of pension contributions. Yet the institutional forms 
with which pension providers are controlled are anything but based on long-term 
investment management. The PICs cannot too easily build long-term portfolios 
suitable to such publicly pursued function because they are controlled by in content 
different from but in form similar to private sector insurance company regulations. 
There are a number of tensions related to investment activities, including the need 
to meet solvency requirements even daily if necessary, the fact that strategy choices 
are dependent on others’ (due to equity-linked and EMU buffers, and fund transfer 
obligations), the competitive pressures to enhance window dressing, and so on.
It could be argued that the difference in institutional life of control in (private) 
asset and (public) liability sides of the field in general generates some tensions 
between the field and individual actor levels. Yet it must be noted that it is exactly 
these kinds of tensions and inconsistencies that may give a multi-actor field 
flexibility to accommodate new purposes to previous practices (i.e. conversion, 
see Crouch 2005). This is another essential feature that needs to be recognised in 
further studies. Yet there might be a great price to be paid for this kind of dynamism. 
While the decentralised TEL system served to divide the pension assets to multiple 
smaller capital bases defined by domestic interests and a means not to build a single 
large capital base for ‘pension socialism’, the current aim of the same decentralised 
system is connected to getting extra revenues and better risk management out of 
divergent and competing portfolios of the pension insurers. The unsolved challenge 
here is that the investment portfolios of pension providers have diverged only during 
the recent financial crisis, and there are no guarantees that the game theoretical 
setting of mutual relationships enables the production of permanently different 
portfolios. If roughly similar investment strategies are followed the likely gains in 
upholding a decentralised system are bound to be small, and the cost-containment 
pressures caused by financialisation may become imminent. The development of 
organisational forms is a closely related issue. The market has continued to be 
dominated by the two largest insurance companies. The relatively weak role of 
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the company funds and industry-wide funds has further weakened via political and 
economic incentives to close down the establishments. From a power perspective, 
this is a curious development since company pension funds and organisation-wide 
funds give more control over the organisation as well as investments. The withering 
away of alternative organisation forms combined with high concentration of pension 
insurance industry provides in paradox a platform for political attempts both to 
radically strengthen the competition between PICs and to centralise the system.
All in all, these three tensions suggest that even the ideal types of public 
administration and corporate governance are relevant in understanding the 
governance of PPP type pension provision, and thus should not be abandoned but 
elaborated with further empirical research from two ideal types to broad institutional 
frameworks that can address pension governance in various different schemes and 
regimes. What the particular field logics in TyEL provision more generally provides 
us is one important lesson on all institutional analyses on pension systems: all the 
institutional changes are bound to alter the roles and positions of a number of actors 
within the fields of pension provision. The analogue to a game is again useful here. 
A game of rugby, football and American football share a family resemblance as 
they all involve a plain field with goals, which is populated by players involved 
in the struggle over a possession of a ball. The differences in rules delegate these 
games into different species. If the initial composition of the pension game has 
allowed enough room for players to change their behaviour in the field, we do 
not have a clear understanding of the game to begin with. This is how the game 
of decentralised and only partly institutionalised Finnish pension governance is 
played. The players change slowly and the loyal (or in Finnish case, forced) fans 
come to see every match. But it is not that obvious how the game is played in each 
match. Sometimes it is played with muddy feet, sometimes in shiny armour, and 
sometimes you are not even allowed to touch the ball with your hands (unless 
you happen to be the goalkeeper that day). The existence of two balls and goals, 
the pigskin and the goal line (the assets), and the football and the soccer goal net 
(the contributions and liabilities), is not too helpful for analysing the relationships 
between the players either. What makes the Finnish case important is that despite 
these curious fluctuations in the game it has been able to continue and that the 
players have learned to play the game and to relate themselves to other players.
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The semi-public, quasi-private, pseudo-centralised management of Finnish earnings-
related pension institutions provides some implications for research questions in 
further examination of the pension fields in other European countries. The PPP form 
of pension provision has recently gained popularity in many EU countries. It may 
be that the Finnish exceptionalism is turning into European business as usual. This 
raises interesting questions on the purpose of public-private arrangements in other 
European countries. Are they meant to be government protected safe havens for 
businesses to evade international competition, or do they represent new competition-
prized paradigms in European pension provision? Whatever the answer is to this 
and other such questions, our case study shows that these kinds of goals can be 
combined, possibly without excluding all the virtues or including all the vices of 
the other, but more than likely not without difficult tensions and compromises 
with very local institutional characteristics. Furthermore, whatever the purpose 
of new arrangements is, the big question is how these emerging partnerships will 
handle the tension between public and private interests in practice. Who bears the 
risks within these arrangements: do the institutions increase risks of individuals in 
securing their own pensions, and what is the role of the government guarantees, 
or corporate and financial sector institutions? The answer to these questions is not 
only of academic interest in comparative studies, for the diffusion of new practices 
might very well incite new supra-national regulation which could also affect already 
well established PPPs in pension provision.
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7 Discussion
More or less independent on the question of how public and private logics are put 
in play, the field level analysis on the institutional governance of Finnish TyEL 
pension provision has provided us some new insights on its past, present and future. 
The dual life in the asset side and benefits and costs side is one such conceptual 
division that helps to understand time and change in the field. However, some raised 
issues are of great practical relevance on the field. There is a number of aspects 
in the past of the field that indicate a path dependence on its origins, including 
reliable public pension provision, private decentralisation of ownership, and the 
ability to coordinate capital to national economic projects without central planning. 
Yet all these essential path dependencies can be questioned as viable forces of 
explanation for future changes in governance while regarded as important contexts 
for understanding the current state of TyEL governance.
When it comes to reliable pension provision, the current flexible governance 
structure with automatic adjustments and expertise-prized coordination has its 
advantages when cost constraints or long-term economic adjustments are made. 
But should there be broad dissent towards the benefits provided by the pension 
scheme, there are no guarantees the parity-powered and party politically locked 
labour market parties are willing or even able to reply to public contestation. If the 
government is not willing to adjust other pension schemes, the political incentive 
of taking more control over TyEL scheme is substantial. The long-term underdogs 
in the pension field, the democratic political institutions, that have had a limited 
role in the field despite constitutional changes strengthening the decision-making 
capacity of the parliament, might find their field status rising in one way or another.
In case of decentralisation, the legacies of diverse organisational forms in 
provider choice and coordination efforts have given the mature field vibrant 
dynamism and adaptation capabilities beyond theoretical expectations. The TyEL 
scheme has ostensibly enjoyed the two worlds of collaboration and competition. 
But in some cases, it has also adopted typical problems from both these worlds. The 
penetration of competition to all aspects of PIC operations has occurred although the 
regulative-normative framework in which competition happens has not substantially 
changed in many areas. This is why boundary crossings and relations to other fields 
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of economic activity become essential. This puts the smaller PICs with no economies 
of scale in investments and the one group-independent company without broader 
PR machinery in very difficult positions. Although financial conglomerates are 
supposed to keep the pension insurance activities separate from other conglomerate 
functions, it seems evident that in selling new insurance policies with marketing 
channels through banks and in combination with other insurance policies gives a 
competitive edge to large financial warehouses.  
Ex post facto collaboration arrangements like equity-linked and EMU buffers 
in fund transfers and joint liabilities also make de facto collaboration difficult: 
all decisions are tied not only to all providers but also their existing mutual 
relationships. In this way, collaboration cannot easily break institutional legacies 
and boundaries but rather focus on limited maintenance and minor exclusions in 
coordination. Should the ‘game theoretical’ and antagonistic relations become too 
infected, it is unlikely they can be resolved without addressing the current field 
formation. Furthermore, the dependency on international financial markets shows 
that effective institutional change in times of crisis requires collaboration and 
leadership hard to grasp without able centralised coordination. In this respect, the 
virtue of decentralisation may have turned to the vice of its institutional goals (e.g. 
party political independence of capital, financial performance).
Despite TEL/TyEL having been from day one a national project with political and 
institutional compromises, this nature has eroded year after year. This is mostly due 
to the position of the field in the broader society. There is no more need for exclusive 
independent capital base, coordinated or not, to finance the Finnish economy, 
which is fuelled by the global financial markets. Now, the TyEL capital plays the 
intrinsic role as a local source for emergency financing (via premium lending), as the 
heavy capital for complementary financing including public and other guarantors, 
and as the central normative and discursive authority in the best network position 
in the whole Finnish financial sector – but still far from anything resembling a 
national project. The pension benefits hold their national regulative position, as the 
second and third pillar pension savings arrangements remain somewhat low. Yet 
an important feature here is the decrease in discursive understanding and political 
interest in considering the field as a national project among labour market parties. 
Although there are still some highly political questions like the mandatory retirement 
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age or the composition of the top authority in the field, which are enough to raise a 
struggle over authority in TyEL scheme, the consistent political programme-level 
demands towards using the scheme to some political purposes, either in asset or 
liability side, have become scarce. The main political issues are related to more 
parametric sharing of costs and risks.
Perhaps the most intriguing path dependency related to the scheme is the need 
to follow the EU regulations in demarcating the line between collaboration and 
competition. The external threat endangering the basic structure did not materialise 
when Finland joined EU, but Finnish exceptionalism continues to require re-
affirmation in the EU-level decision-making. This said, the external threat of EU 
has also been used as a tool to influence the internal borders within the system. In 
particular, the original exemption to the Life Insurance Directive is instrumental in 
promoting more government influence in pension policy to emphasise its legally 
mandated nature. Another type of EU influence is related to the strengthening of the 
competition to promote functioning of single market. The domestic watchdog for 
promoting competition has pointed out deficiencies in competition and suggested 
ways to enhance it. This way, EU regulation has given more voice to actors with 
divergent goals of the field.
One of the most characteristic features in the history of the field is the fact that 
technically minor changes produce major impacts on the functioning of the system, 
best illustrated by the asset side changes like the 1997 solvency rule reform (Dixon 
& Sorsa 2009) and the constant parametric changes in benefit and cost formulae 
accumulating to paradigmatic changes in social policy paradigms (Hinrichs & 
Kangas 2003). In political terms, this gives the TyEL field odd characteristics. Some 
parametric changes like changes in retirement age have generated public interest, 
but numerous other changes haven’t. One recent change, the introduction of life 
expectancy coefficient, is one belonging to the latter category. It will significantly 
curb the monthly pension benefits of future pensioners as they live longer. There 
has been a lot of public debate concerning the mechanism but only after it was 
introduced – with almost no broad debate when it was drafted and negotiated. The 
technocratic decision-making strictly within the field boundaries likely decreases 
trust towards the scheme. For one thing, individual voluntary third pillar schemes 
are likely to gain more popularity, as the level of mandatory benefits is perceived 
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to be cut. The future changes are as result more connected with the combination 
of the earnings-related DB scheme and the voluntary third-pillar DC schemes. The 
technocratic ethos of creating as sustainable a mandatory earnings-related system as 
possible, both in terms of economic sustainability and field-wide legitimacy, may 
produce controversial results by actually eroding the popularity of the TyEL scheme 
and creating a large third pillar pension system. Thus we conclude that the famous 
idea of Teivo Pentikäinen, one of the portrayed “fathers” of the TEL scheme, that 
the main threats of the earnings-related scheme are not economic but political is 
true but only if we think that the maintenance of the economic sustainability of the 
scheme is actually one of the key political risks.
96 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Bibliography
Aaltonen, J., 2009. EK:n Fagernäs: Eläkeiäksi 67 vuotta. Helsingin Sanomat 
22.10.2009, B7.
Arajärvi, P., 2006. Selvitys Eläketurvakeskuksen asemasta. Sosiaali- ja terveys-
ministeriön selvityksiä. 
Barabási, A., 2002. Linked: The new science of networks. Cambridge: Perseus 
Publishing.
Boeri, T., Bovenberg, A.L., Coeuré, B. and Roberts, A.W., 2006. Dealing with 
the New Giants: Rethinking the Role of Pension Funds. London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research.
Bonoli, G., 2000. The Politics of Pension Reform: Institutions and Policy Change 
in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press.
Bonoli, G. and Palier, B., 2007. When Past Reforms Open New Opportunities: 
Comparing Old-age Insurance Reforms in Bismarckian Welfare Systems. 
Social Policy & Administration, 41(6), 555–573.
Briganti, F., 2008. Overview of the privately managed pension schemes subject to 
the Regulation 1408/71, European conference on the future of mixed retirement 
financing, 23 October 2008.
Campbell, J.L., 2004. Institutional change and globalization. Princeton, N.J.; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Carmel, E. and Papadopoulos, T., 2003. The new governance of social security in 
the UK. In: J. Millar, ed, Understanding Social Security. Bristol: Policy Press, 
pp. 31–52.
Clark, G.L., 1998. Stylized Facts and Close Dialogue: Methodology in Economic 
Geography. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 88(1), 73–87.
Clark, G.L., 2000. Pension fund capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, G.L., 2003. European pensions & global finance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Clark, G.L., 2008. Governing Finance: Global Imperatives and the Challenge of 
Reconciling Community Representation with Expertise. Economic Geography, 
84(3), 281–302.
Clark, G.L. and Thrift, N., 2004. The return of bureaucracy: managing dispersed 
knowledge in global finance. In: K. Knorr Cetina and A. Preda, eds, The 
sociology of financial markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 229–249.
97FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Clark, G.L. and Whiteside, N., 2005. Pension security in the 21st century : redrawing 
the public-private debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crouch, C., 2005. Capitalist Diversity and Change - Recombinant Governance and 
Institutional Entrepreneurs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crouch, C. and Streeck, W., 1997. Political economy of modern capitalism: mapping 
convergence and diversity. London: SAGE.
Crouch, C., Streeck, W., Whitley, R. and Campbell, J.L., 2007. Institutional change 
and globalization. Socio-Economic Review, 5(3), 527–567.
Cyert, R. and March, J., 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall.
De la Porte, C. and Pochet, P., 2002. Introduction. In: C. De la Porte and P. Pochet, 
eds, Building Social Europe Through the Open Method of Co-ordination. 
Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 11–26.
Delbridge, R. and Edwards, T., 2007. Reflections on developments in institutional 
theory: Toward a relational approach. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 
23, 191–205.
Dimaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W., 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American 
sociological review, 48(2), 147.
Dixon, A.D., 2008. The Rise of Pension Fund Capitalism in Europe: An Unseen 
Revolution? New Political Economy, 13(3), 249.
Dixon, A.D. and Sorsa, V., 2009. Institutional Change  and the Financialisation of 
Pensions in Europe. Competition & Change, 13(4), 347–367.
Eckhardt, M., 2005. The open method of coordination on pensions: an economic 
analysis of its effects on pension reforms. Journal of European Social Policy, 
15(3), 247–267.
Ellison, R., ed, 2007. The pension trustee’s handbook : the definitive guide to the 
trustee’s role and obligations. 5th edn. London: Thorogood.
European Commission. 2008. Privately managed funded pension provision and 
their contribution to adequate and sustainable pensions.
Gortner, H.F., Mahler, J. and Nicholson, J.B., 1997. Organization theory: a public 
perspective. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Green, S.E.,Jr, Babb, M. and Alpaslan, C.M., 2008. Institutional Field Dynamics 
and the Competition Between Institutional Logics: The Role of Rhetoric in the 
Evolving Control of the Modern Corporation. Management Communication 
Quarterly, 22(1), 40–73.
98 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R. and Hinings, C.R., 2002. Theorizing Change: The 
Role of Professional Associations in the Transformation of Institutionalized 
Fields. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 58.
Gronow, A., 2008. Not by Rules or Choice Alone: A Pragmatist Critique of 
Institution Theories in Economics and Sociology. Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 4(3), 351–373.
Hall, P.A. and Thelen, K., 2009. Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. 
Socio-Economic Review, 7(1), 7–34.
Hansmann, H., 2000. The Ownership of Enterprise. Canada: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.
Hardy, C., Phillips, N. and Lawrence, T.B., 2003. Resources, Knowledge and 
Influence: The Organizational Effects of Interorganizational Collaboration. 
Journal of Management Studies, 40(2), 321–347.
Hargrave, T. and Van de Ven, A., 2006. A Collective Action Model of Institutional 
Innovation. The Academy of Management Review, 31(4), 864.
HE 180/2008. Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle lakisääteistä  eläkevakuutustoimintaa 
harjoittavien eläkelaitosten sijoitustoimintaa ja vakavaraisuutta koskevien 
säännösten muuttamista koskevaksi  lainsäädännöksi. Hallituksen esitys.
Helco, H., 1978. Issue networks and the executive establishment. In A. King, ed., 
The new american political system.Washington DC: American Enterprise 
Institute, 87–124.
Heiskala, R., 2007. Economy and society: from Parsons through Habermas to 
semiotic institutionalism. Social Science Information, 46(2), 243–272.
Heiskanen, I. and Johanson, E., 1985. Finnish Interlocking Directorships. 
Institutional Groups and Their evolving Integration. In: F. Stokman, F. Ziegler 
and  J. Scott, eds, Networks of Corporate Power. Glasgow: Polity Press.
Hietaniemi, M. and Ritola, S., eds, 2007. The Finnish Pension System. Helsinki: 
Finnish Centre for Pensions.
Hinrichs, K. and Kangas, O., 2003. When Is a Change Big Enough to Be a System 
Shift? Small System-shifting Changes in German and Finnish Pension Policies. 
Social Policy and Administration, 37, 573–591.
Hodgson, G.M., 2006. What are institutions. Journal of economic issues, 40(1), 1.
Holzmann, R. and Palmer, E.E., eds,  2006. Pension reform: issues and prospect 
for non-financial defined contribution (NDC) schemes. Washington, D.C.: 
London: World Bank ; Eurospan [distributor].
99FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Huhtanen, R., 2006. Eläketurvakeskuksen asemasta ja tehtävistä. In: J. Kultalahti 
and  S. Penttilä, eds, Oikeus- ja vakuutustiedettä 2006. Tampere: Tampereen 
yliopisto, oikeustieteiden laitos, pp. 19–52.
Iivonen, A., 2009. Tarmo Pukkila eläkkeelle: Lähtö ja loitsu. Työeläke, 44(4), 18–21.
Immergut, E.M. and Anderson, K.M., 2007. Editors’ Introduction: The Dynamics 
of Pension Policies. In: E.M. Immergut, K.M. Anderson and  I. Schulze, eds, 
Handbook of West European pension politics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 1–45.
Immergut, E.M., Anderson, K.M. and Schulze, I., 2007. Handbook of West European 
pension politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jäntti, M., Saari, J. and Vartiainen, J., 2006. Growth and Equity in Finland. WIDER 
Discussion Paper 2006/06. World Institute for Development Economic 
Research (UNU-WIDER).
Kallio, I., 2005. Vakuutuksenottajan oikeudet työeläkevakuutusyhtiön varallisuuteen. 
Helsinki: Suomen vakuutusalan koulutus ja Kustannus Oy.
Kallio, I., 2008. Lakisääteisen eläkevakuutuksen uudelleenjärjestely. In: J. Tepora, 
L. Sisula-Tulokas, M. Hemmo, T. Lohi and E. Kolehmainen, eds, Business law 
forum 2008. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston yksityisoikeuden laitos, .
Kalliomäki, K., 2009. Puoliksi ratkaistu. Työeläke, 44(4), 5.
Kangas, O., 2006. Pensions and Pension Funds in the Making of a Nation-State and 
a National Economy: The Case of Finland. Social Policy and Development 
Programme Paper Number 25. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development.
Kangas, O., 2007. Finland: Labor Markets Against Politics. In: E.M. Immergut, 
K.M. Anderson and I. Schulze, eds, Handbook of West European pension 
politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248–296.
Kari, M. and Pakaslahti, J., 2003. EU-Suomen sosiaaliturvajärjestelmä. Helsinki: 
Suomen vakuutusalan koulutus ja kustannus,.
Kausto, R., 2002. Selvitys Suomen työeläkejärjestelmän riskeistä. 16. Helsinki: 
Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön monisteita.
Keskusjärjestöjen ja hallituksen yhteisymmärrys eläkekiistan ratkaisemisesta, 
2009. Available online at: http://www.ek.fi/www/fi/tyoelama/liitteet/
Yhteisymmaerrys_elaekekiistan_ratkaisemiseksi_110309_2.pdf (accessed 
7 December 2009).
Kivisaari, E., 2007. Työeläkevakuutusyhtiöiden laskuperusteiden yhtiökohtaisuus. 
Helsinki: Finanssialan Keskusliitto.
100 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Korpi, W., 2001. Contentious institutions: an augmented rational-action analysis 
of the origins and path dependency of welfare state institutions in Western 
countries. Rationality and society, 13(2), 235.
Kortesoja, I. and Huikuri, N., 2009. Eläke- ja muun sosiaaliturvan kehittämis- ja 
yhteistyöryhmät. Helsinki: Eläketurvakeskus.
Langbein, J.H., 1997. The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of 
Commerce. The Yale law journal, 107(1), 165–189.
Langley, P., 2008a. The everyday life of global finance : saving and borrowing in 
Anglo-America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Langley, P., 2008b. Pension fund capitalism, pension fund socialism, and the politics 
of dissent. In: M. Taylor, ed, Global Economy Contested. London: Routledge, 
pp. 141–157.
Lawrence, T.B. and Suddaby, R., 2006. Institutions and Institutional Work. In: 
S. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. Lawrence And  W.R. Nord, eds, The Sage handbook 
of organization studies. 2nd edn. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage 
Publications, pp. 215–254.
Lawrence, T.B., Suddaby, R. and Leca, B., 2009. Institutional Work: Actors and 
Agency in Institutional Studies of Organizations. Cambridge University Press.
Levy, D. and Scully, M., 2007. The Institutional Entrepreneur as Modern Prince: 
The Strategic Face of Power in Contested Fields. Organization Studies, 28(7), 
971–991.
Louekoski, M., 1996. Muistio työeläkeyhtiöistä: työ eläke vakuutus yhtiö lain-
säädännön kehittämistä koskeva selvitystehtävä. Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja 
terveysministeriö.
Louekoski, M., 1997. Työeläketurva suomalaisen yhteiskunnan osana – miten tähän 
on tultu ja miten tästä eteenpäin. In: P. Varoma, ed, Eläkepolitiikka 2000-luvulle. 
Helsinki: Eläketurvakeskus, Työeläkelaitosten liitto, pp. 608–649.
Louekoski, M., 2005. Työeläkevakuutusyhtiölain uudistamistarpeet: Selvityshenkilön 
väliraportti. 15. Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön työryhmämuistioita.
Lounsbury, M., 2008. Institutional rationality and practice variation: New directions 
in the institutional analysis of practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
33(4-5), 349–361.
Lundqvist, B., 1998. Eläkepolitiikan innovatiivisuuden rajat. In: H. Niemelä, 
J. Saari and K. Salminen, eds, Innovatiivinen sosiaalipolitiikka. Helsinki: 
Kansaneläkelaitos, pp. 153–170.
101FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Maguire, S., Hardy, C. and Lawrence, T., 2004. Institutional entrepreneurship 
in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. Academy of 
Management Journal.
Martin, J., 2003. What Is Field Theory? American Journal of Sociology, 109(1), 
1–49.
Martin, R., 2002. Institutional Approaches in Economic Geography. In: E. Sheppard 
and T.J. Barnes, eds, A Companion to Economic Geography. Blackwell 
Reference Online: Blackwell Publishing.
Mattila, M., 1997. From Qualified Majority to Simple Majority: The Effects of 
the 1992 Change in the Finnish Constitution. Scandinavian Political Studies, 
20(4), 331–346.
Monk, A.H.B., 2009. The Geography of Pension Liabilities and Fund Governance 
in the United States. Environment and Planning A 41(4), 859–878.
Montagne, S., 2007. In Trusts we Trust: Pension Funds between Social Protection 
and Financial Speculation. Economic Sociology: The European Electronic 
Newsletter 8(3). Available online at: http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_
soc_08-3.pdf#page=1 (accessed 7 December 2009)
Myllymäki, A., 2009. Eläketurvakeskusta koskevan sääntelyn uudistamistarpeiden 
selvittäminen. Available online at: http://www.stm.fi/julkaisut/nayta/_
julkaisu/1082452#fi (accessed 7 December 2009)
Niemelä, H., 1994. Suomen kokonaiseläkejärjestelmän muotoutuminen. 2nd edn. 
Helsinki: Kansaneläkelaitos, tutkimus- ja kehitysyksikkö.
Niemelä, H. and Salminen, K., 1999. Social modernization in two states of the 
European periphery. Social security and health reports 32. Helsinki: Social 
Insurance Institution, Finland.
Niemelä, H. and Salminen, K., 2009. Kansallisten eläkestrategioiden muotoutuminen 
ja Euroopan unionin avoin koordinaatiomenetelmä. Sosiaali- ja terveysturvan 
tutkimuksia 104. Helsinki: Social Insurance Institution, Finland.
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nousiainen, J., 2001. From Semi-presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: 
Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland. Scandinavian Political 
Studies, 24(2), 95–109.
Nutt, P. and Backoff, R., 1992. Strategic management of public and third sector 
organizations: A handbook for leaders. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
102 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Nyce, S.A. and Schieber, S.J., 2005. The economic implications of aging societies: 
the costs of living happily ever after. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
OECD, 2001. Financial management and control of public agencies. Sigma papers, 32.
Overbye, E., 1996. Pension Politics in the Nordic Countries: A Case Study. 
International Political Science Review, 17(1), 67–90.
Peck, J., 2000. Doing Regulation. In: G.L. Clark, M.P. Feldman and  M.S. Gertler, 
eds, Oxford handbook of economic geography. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 61–80.
Pentikäinen, T., 1997. Muistelua ja kommentteja työeläkejärjestelmästä. In: 
P. Varoma, ed, Eläkepolitiikka 2000-luvulle. Helsinki: Eläketurvakeskus, 
Työeläkelaitosten liitto, pp. 8–161.
Perkmann, M. and Spicer, A., 2007. ` Healing the Scars of History’: Projects, Skills 
and Field Strategies in Institutional Entrepreneurship. Organization Studies, 
28(7), 1101–1122.
Peters, B.G., 1992. The policy process: an institutionalist perspective. Canadian 
Public Administration, 35(2), 160–180.
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. and Hardy, C., 2000. Interorganizational Collaboration 
and the Dynamics of Institutional Fields. Journal of management studies, 
37(2), 23–43.
Provan, K.G., Fish, A., and Sydow, J., 2007. Interorganizational networks at the 
network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal 
of Management, 33(3): 479–516.
Puttonen, V. and Torstila, S., 2003. Risk management in Finnish pension funds: A 
survey. Finnish Journal of Business Economics, (52), 31–46.
Rajaniemi, E., 2007. Työeläkejärjestelmän kilpailuolosuhteet. Selvityshenkilön 
raportti. 2006:79. Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön selvityksiä.
Rantanen, E., 2009, Eläkeyhtiöt palailevat kasinolle Talouselämä 27 October 
2009. Available online at: http://www.talouselama.fi/uutiset/article341126.
ece?s=u&amp;wtm=te-27102009 (accessed 7 December 2009).
Salminen, K., 1987. Yhteiskunnan rakenne, politiikka ja eläketurva: kokonais eläke-
turvan muotoutuminen Suomessa ja Ruotsissa. Helsinki: Eläketurvakeskus.
Schludi, M., 2005. The Reform of Bismarckian Pension Systems: A Comparison of 
Pension Politics in Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press.
103FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Scott, W.R., 2008. Institutions and organizations: ideas and interests. 3rd edn. 
London: SAGE.
Securities Market Association, 2008. Finnish Corporate Governance Code. 
Securities Market Association.
Seies, E., 2006. Puron ryhmä tarkoittaa valtaa. Talouselämä 16 June 2006. Available 
online at: http://www.talouselama.fi/docview.do?f_id=923898 (accessed 
7 December 2009)
Soede, A. and Vrooman, C., 2008. A Comparative Typology of Pension Regimes. 
ENEPRI research report no. 54. European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes.
Streeck, W. and Thelen, K., eds,  2005. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change 
in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
TELA, 2006. Työeläkevakuuttajat TELAn omistajaohjauksen periaatteet. Helsinki: 
The Finnish Pension Alliance.
TELA, 2007. Työeläkeasenteet 2007. Helsinki: TNS Gallup Oy.
TELA, 2008. Principles for Responsible Investment of the Finnish Pension Alliance 
TELA. Helsinki: The Finnish Pension Alliance.
Thompson, L.H., 2001. Operation of pension systems. Public or private? In: I. 
Ortiz, ed, Social Protection in Asia and the Pacific. Asian Development Bank, 
pp. 235–256.
Työmarkkinoiden keskusjärjestöjen eläkeneuvotteluryhmä, 1996. Työeläkeyhtiöiden 
sijoitustoiminnan kehittäminen. Helsinki.
Vidlund, M., 2006. Old-age pension reforms in the EU-15 countries at a time of 
retrenchment. Finnish Centre for Pensions Working Papers 2006:1. Helsinki: 
Finnish Centre for Pensions.
Whiteford, P. and Whitehouse, E., 2006. Pension Challenges and Pension Reforms 
in Oecd Countries. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(1), 78–94.
Yin, R.K., 2009. Case study research: design and methods. 4th edn. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage.
Zaidi, A., Marin, B. and Fuchs, M., 2006. Pension policy in Eu25 and its possible 
impact on elderly poverty. Vienna, Austria: European Centre for Social Welfare 
Policy and Research.
104 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, REPORTS
Pension Governance in Finland
Appendix 1. The working and development groups of Finnish 
pension regime in 2008 
Temporary Working Groups Permanent Working Groups
Ministry-
set groups
- Pensions Forum* 
- Regulation of Centre of 
Pensions*  
- Development of church pension 
scheme* 
- Negotiation group on 
Rehabilitation* 
- social security of immigration 
and emigration* 
- Depression prevention project 
(MASTO)* 
- Social Security reform 
committee (SATA-committee)* 
- Coordination group of labour 
market coordination* 
- Developmenf of social security 
for the self- employed* 
- Elderly and Pensions issues 
negotiation group* 
- Elderly and pensioners 
negotiation group*
- EU-issues Committee, preparatory section 
25* 
- EU-issues Committee, preparatory section 
27* 
- Industry-wide fund and company fund group 
Groups 
internal to 
pension 
system
- Pension Record coordination 
group (OTEKO)* 
- VILMA-record follow-up group* 
- EC transfer law special bases following 
group* 
- Calculation bases negotiation group (in 
TELA)* 
- Calculation bases section (in TELA) 
- Investment issues negotiation group (in 
TELA)* 
- T-group (the pension providers’ general 
discussion group)* 
- Insurance supervision negotiation group (in 
ETK) 
- The negotiation group of self-employed (YNK) 
- Insurance condition section (in TELA) 
- Pension information group (ELNA, in TELA)* 
- EU and international affairs negotiation group 
(in TELA)* 
- JENKKA-group (ETK and KELA mutual 
communications group)* 
- KAIHO working group (EU pension issues 
discussion group)* 
- Rehabilitation issues working group (in 
TELA)* 
- Supplementary benefits group (in ETK)* 
- Part-time pensions group (discussion group 
between ETK, pension providers and Porasto)* 
- Pension decisions section (in TELA)* 
- Legislation Interpretation Group* 
- TyEL supervision coordination group (TYKO-
group)
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Temporary Working Groups Permanent Working Groups
(Groups 
internal to 
pension 
system)
- Unemployment pensions group (between 
ETK and pension providers)* 
- Paid-up pension group* 
- Responsibility division group 
- TILMO-working group* 
- YHELLA support group* 
- Insurance IT services group* 
- IT Processing group (TKT)* 
- EU technical group* 
- EU Information system group*
Labour 
market 
organisation 
set groups
- Labour Market Central Organisations’ 
Negotiation Group (so-called Rantala group)*
Other 
groups
- The Negotiation Group for 
Pension Issues (set by KELA 
board)* 
- Work/life-balance -programme 
steering and follow-up group*
- Nordic Social Statistics Committee* 
- Social and Health Sector statistics 
cooperation group* 
* Included in the data in Figure 1.
** Some of the  ICT-related groups omitted from the list.
Source: Kortesoja & Huikuri (2009).
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The Finnish Centre for Pensions is the statutory central body 
of the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme. Its research 
activities mainly cover the fields of social security and pension 
schemes. The studies aim to paint a comprehensive picture of 
the sociopolitical, sociological  and financial aspects involved.
Eläketurvakeskus on Suomen työeläkejärjestelmän lakisäätei-
nen keskuslaitos. Sen tutkimustoiminta koostuu pääasiassa so-
siaaliturvaan ja työeläkejärjestelmiin liittyvistä aiheista. Tutki-
muksissa pyritään monipuolisesti ottamaan huomioon sosiaali-
poliittiset, sosiologiset ja taloudelliset näkökulmat.
Pensionsskyddscentralen är lagstadgat centralorgan för 
arbetspensionssystemet i Finland. Forskningsverksamheten 
koncentrerar sig i huvudsak på den sociala tryggheten och på 
de olika pensionssystemen. Målet för forskingsprojekten är att 
mångsidigt belysa aspekter inom socialpolitik, sociologi och 
ekonomi.
